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INTRODUCTION 
On January 5, 1993, a single-hulled oil tanker named Braer ran 
aground in the Shetland Islands, ten miles off the coast of Scotland. 
The vessel drifted inland, coming to rest at the base of rocky, 100-foot 
cliffs in a sheltered cove known as Garth's Nest. There, the Braer 
threatened to break apart and release its cargo of twenty-five million 
gallons of oil, more than twice that of the Exxon Valdez. That night, 
a knowledgeable journalist and conservationist reported the story 
through an American radio network and concluded, "V nder interna-
tional law, I don't believe the Captain can be charged, but one must 
question the prudence of his seamanship."l 
Major oil spills of this nature occur periodically. Each time they do, 
attention is focused on the threat of marine pollution. Some incidents 
have forced international legal scholars to address the issue.2 Others 
have stirred the Congress to act after decades ofinaction.3 More often, 
1 All Things Considered: Interview with Mr. Jonathan Wills (N ational Public Radio broadcast, 
Jan. 5, 1993) [hereinafter Wills]. 
2 See JOHN W. KINDT, MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 42 (1986) (describing 
reaction to Campeche Bay oil rig blowout in 1979 (citing Mexican Oil Blowaut Signals Massive 
Find, Hazards for Ecology, WASH. POST, June 10, 1979, § A, at 20»; Alan T. Leonhard, Ixtoc I: 
A Test for the Emerging Concept of the Patrimonial Sea, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 617 (1980); 
Jordan J. Paust, The Mexican Oil Spill: Jurisdiction, Immunity, and Acts of State, 2 Hous. J. 
INT'L L. 239 (1979); F. Daniel Leventhal, Comment, The Bay of Campeche Oil Spill: Obtaining 
Jurisdiction Over Petroleos Mexicanos Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 
9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 341 (1980); William N. Hancock & Robert M. Stone, Note, Liability for 
Transnational Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil Rig Blowauts, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. 
REV. 377 (1982); Note, Domestic and International Liability for the Bay of Campeche Oil Spill, 
6 INTL TRADE J. 55 (1981). 
3 See Benjamin H. Grumbles, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Mixing Oil, Water, and Hazard-
aus Waste, 4 GEO. INTL ENVTL. L. REV. 151 (1991) (describing the Congressional response to 
the Exxon Valdez spill of 1989). 
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the public attention given to these disasters fades as the ocean assimi-
lates the pollution.4 
Dealing with the pollution problems caused by spills is further 
complicated by the jurisdictional issues inherent in the international 
law of marine pollution.5 When the Congress passed the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990,6 it was responding to the environmental disaster caused 
by the Exxon Valdez SpilP On its surface, the Oil Pollution Act seems 
to have solved the jurisdictional problems under international law by 
ignoring the rules.8 Upon more careful analysis, however, the views 
of Hugo Grotius, often referred to as the "Father of International 
Law,"9 appear to be more accurately reflected in the Oil Pollution Act 
than in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.lO 
This article presents the view that the economic effects of maritime 
oil spills justify the Oil Pollution Act's broad scope and use of criminal 
penalties. Moreover, enforcing criminal penalties against foreign ves-
sels in U.S. waters is provided in the statute, is necessary to imple-
ment the congressional purpose, is permissible under recent judicial 
interpretations of international law principles, and would more accu-
rately reflect the intent of Hugo Grotius than the approach taken in 
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Such an interpretation 
will require the United States to lead the world toward a new inter-
pretation of the law of the sea. The time to do so is now. 
The first part of this article briefly reviews the marine transporta-
tion of oil, the history of the international law of the sea,l1 the tradi-
4 KINDT, supra note 2, at 42. 
5 Id. at 8. 
6 Pub. L. No. 101-380,104 Stat 484 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1991) and 
in various sections throughout titles 16,26,43, and 46 of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter OPAl. 
7 Grumbles, supra note 3, at 153-54; KINDT, supra note 2, at 4 (indicating that protective 
legislation following catastrophic oil spill is a "prime example" of immediate action taken to 
forestall pending ecological disaster (citing D. J. Cusine, Liability far Oil Pollution Under the 
Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 105 (1978»); John L. Pedrick, 
Jr., Tankship Design Regulation and Its Economic Effect on Oil Consumers, 9 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 377 (1978); Frank E. Sisson III, Oil Pollution Law of the Limitation of Liability Act: A 
Murky Sea far Claimants Against Vessels, 9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 285 (1978); Comment, A 
Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act: How Super is the "Superfund"?, 
1978 DET. C.L. REV. 277. 
8 See OPA § 4301(c); Cf United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened far 
signature, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.621122 (1982) reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), 
[hereinafter UNCLOS or Convention]. 
9 KINDT, supra note 2, at 8. For a discussion of Grotius' views, see infra notes 34-55 and 
accompanying text. 
10 As Justice Cardozo observed, "[T]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of 
its logic may be counteracted by the tendency to confine itself within the limits of history." 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921). 
11 On the theory that "the effect of history is to make the path of logic clear." Id. at 51. 
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tional methods used to accommodate pollution control measures 
within the law of the sea, and the limits of the current approach. Part 
two discusses the methods Congress chose before 1990 to control 
marine pollution and the wealmesses of those methods. Part three 
discusses a few recent developments in the criminal enforcement of 
environmental law, the crimes adopted in the Oil Pollution Act, and 
the conflict between the use of those criminal provisions and interna-
tional law. Part four analyzes recent developments and shows how 
developing trends support the use of the Oil Pollution Act as a cata-
lyst to bring about a new interpretation of the law of the sea, bringing 
it closer to the original intent of its framers and more in accord with 
the needs of today's world. 
1. THE PROBLEM OF POLLUTION THAT CROSSES 
JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES 
A The Maritime Transportation o/Oil 
Each day more than three thousand oil tankers are somewhere on 
the world's oceans.12 Each is carrying part of the 1.7 billion gallons of 
crude oil and oil products shipped each year by sea.13 More than one 
third of this oil is transported through U.S. waters, with an average 
of nearly five tankers a day calling on the port of Houston and four a 
day calling on New York.14 Projections show the volume of this traffic 
will increase in the future due to growing U.S. demand for imported 
oiJ.15 
Although the world has benefitted from the growth of industrial 
technology for almost two hundred years,16 society has tended to 
ignore the increased risks associated with that technology.17 It has 
chosen instead to garner the benefits and delay paying for them.1s It 
is only in the past twenty years that governments have begun to 
address these risks.19 During those years, the world has heard the 
12 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TANKER SPILLS: PREVENTION BY DESIGN 2 (1991) [here-
inafter NRC]. 
IS Id.; accord NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA: INPUTS, FATES, AND EF-
FECTS ch.2 (1985); ROBERT B. CLARK, MARINE POLLUTION 33 (1989). 
14Id. (citing data provided by Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Ltd.). 
16Id. at 2-4. Accord OIL ON THE SEA (David P. Hoult ed., 1969). 
16Id. at 23. 
17Id. at 23-24. See also SEBASTIAN A. GERLACH, MARINE POLLUTION: DIAGNOSIS AND 
THERAPY 1-4 (1981). 
18Id. See also EDWARD D. GOLDBERG, THE HEALTH OF THE OCEANS 24-27 (1976). JEFFREY 
POTTER, DISASTER BY OIL 247-48 (1973). 
19 NRC, supra note 12, at 24. 
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names Amoco Cadiz,20 Torrey Canyon,21 Mega Borg,22 Exxon Valdez,22 
and Argo M erchant24 and has come to view oil spills as tragic accidents 
that require better control over petroleum transport.25 While some 
commentators have cited statistics that indicate 99.995 percent of oil 
arrives safely at its destination,26 an analysis of accident data indicates 
that the current level of risk involved in transporting oil by sea is 
significantly greater than the risks society is willing to accept in other 
activities.27 
The consequences of society's failure to address the risks of oil 
transport on the ocean are not fully known. Certainly, the economic 
and social costs of spills can be very large,28 and the ecological impact 
on the immediately surrounding area can be devastating.29 More im-
portant are the as yet unknown,30 but potentially devastating, effects31 
on the ocean's ecosystem from the cumulative impact of many major 
oil spills through the years. 
B. The History of Maritime Regulation 
The clash of two conflicting principles has governed the law of the 
sea since man first took to the sea in boats.32 One is the right of the 
20 Spilling 1,628,000 barrels of crude oil off the coast of France in 1978. Id. at 16-19. 
21 Spilling 909,000 barrels of crude oil into the English Channel in 1967. Id. 
22 Spilling 14,000 tons of crude oil and catching fire in the Gulf of Mexico in 1990. Id. at 15. 
23 Spilling 267,000 barrels of crude oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska, in 1989. Id. 
24 Spilling 225,000 barrels of crude oil into the Atlantic Ocean in 1976. Id. 
25 Id. at 1,26. 
26 See, e.g., Edgar Gold, Marine Pollution Liability After Exxon Valdez: The U.S. All or 
Nothing Lottery!, 22 J. MAR. L. & COM. 423, 427 (1991). 
27 See NRC, supra note 12, at 24-26 (comparing the risk of an oil tanker spill at 3.32 x 10.5 [3.3 
gallons lost per 100,000 gallons transported] to the risk of an airliner's landing being aborted at 
less than 1 x 10.7 per landing and concluding there is reason to try to reduce the risk of pollution). 
28 JOINT GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE SCIENTIFlC ASPECTS OF MARINE POLLUTION, THE 
STATE OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 40 (1990) (noting that the social costs of the Amoco 
Cadiz wreck were estimated at between $200 and $300 million in 1978). 
29 Id. (noting that the Exxon Valdez spill contaminated over 550 kilometers of coastline, killing 
birds and sea mammals and endangering the future of shrimp, herring, and salmon fisheries). 
30 Cf Gold, supra note 26, at 441 (quoting LAW OF THE SEA-PROTECTION AND PRESERVA-
TION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. 
Al44/461 (18 Sept., 1989) for the proposition that ''petroleum pollution does not now represent 
a severe threat to marine habitats and organisms"). 
31 KINDT, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that as in the case of Lake Erie, environmental systems 
"do not deteriorate gradually but, rather, are able to maintain the basic integrity of their 
character virtually until the point of collapse ... at which point the processes of decay could no 
longer be feasibly arrested"). Accord Max Blumer, Oil Pollution of the Ocean, in OIL ON THE 
SEA, supra note 15, at 10-11. 
32 LOUIS B. SOHN & KRISTEN GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A NUTSHELL xvii (1984); 
see also Yvonne L. Tharpes, International Environmental Law: Turning the Tide on Marine 
Pollution, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 579, 614 (1988-89). 
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coastal state to control the sea closest to its coast; the other is the 
freedom of navigation and fishing on the high seas.33 
Early Roman law supported the freedom of the seas and the con-
cept of common ownership of ocean resources.34 As European coun-
tries explored the oceans and developed empires, however, they also 
claimed dominion over large portions of the world's oceans.35 When 
Spain and Portugal had conflicting claims, they turned to Pope Alex-
ander VI to arbitrate their dispute.36 The Pope awarded large por-
tions of the oceans to each.37 Spain then claimed the Pacific Ocean and 
the Gulf of Mexico, while Portugal claimed the Atlantic Ocean south 
of Morocco and the Indian Ocean.38 Both claimed the right to exclude 
foreigners from navigating or entering those waters.39 
In spite of those claims, the Dutch established settlements at Mau-
ritius, Java, and Malaccus.40 As vessels from the Dutch East India 
Company plied the waters, trading with the East Indies, they had to 
deal with Portuguese galleons trying to stop themY In 1602, the 
captain of a vessel employed by the Dutch East India Company 
captured a Portuguese vessel in the straits of Malacca.42 The capture 
of the vessel and its sale as a prize were so controversial among 
members of the Dutch East India Company that some of them refused 
their shares of the prize.43 Some tried to leave the company and 
reform it elsewhere.44 The company responded to the controversy by 
retaining the international lawyer, Hugo Grotius. He drafted an ar-
gument to justify the capture of the Portuguese galleon,45 as well as 
to refute the claims of Spain and Portugal to the high seas and the 
concomitant right to exclude foreigners from them.46 This argument 
came to be known as "Mare Liberum," or Freedom of the Seas. In 
this now famous argument, Grotius declared his purpose, saying: 
33 SOHN & GUSTAFSON, supra note 32, at xvii; Tharpes, supra note 32, at 614. 
34 Forest L. Grieves, Classical Writers of International Law and the Environment, 4 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 309, 312 (1975); HuGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS vii (1608) 
(Ralph V.D. Magoffin trans. & James B. Scott ed., 1916). 
35 Jan Schneider, Something Old, Something New: Some Thoughts on Grotius and the Marine 
Environment, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 147, 148 (1977); GROTIUS, supra note 34, at 15. 
36Id. 
37 GROTIUS, supra note 34, at 15. 
38 England had similar claims to its south and east. Id. at vii-viii. 
39Id. 
4°Id. at vii. 
41Id. at vi-vii. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
44Id. 
45Id. 
46Id. at viii. 
1993] OIL POLLUTION ACT 
My intention is to demonstrate briefly and clearly that the Dutch 
. .. have the right to sail to the East Indies, as they are now 
doing, and to engage in trade with the people there. I shall base 
my argument on the following most specific and unimpeachable 
axiom of the law of nations, called a primary rule or first principle, 
the spirit of which is self evident and immutable, to wit: every 
nation is free to travel to every other nation and to trade with it.47 
95 
The very next sentence of Grotius' argument confronted the Pope's 
division of the seas between Spain and Portuga1.48 Declaring the 
source and strength of his argument, Grotius wrote, "God himself says 
this, speaking through the voice of nature; and inasmuch as it is not 
His will to have nature supply every place with all the necessities of 
life, He ordains that some nations excel in one art and others in 
another."49 
Grotius began with a general discussion of property, and explained 
that nature has created, and the law has treated, some things as 
available for the use of all, using these words: 
Now as there are some things which every man enjoys in common 
with all other men, and as there are other things which are dis-
tinctly his and belong to no one else, just so has nature willed that 
some of the things which she has created for the use of mankind 
remain common to all, and that others through the industry and 
labor of each man became his own. Laws moreover were given to 
cover both cases so that all men might use common property 
without prejudice to anyone else and in respect to other things so 
that each man having control with what he himself owns might 
refrain from laying his hands on the property of others.50 
Grotius then explained the characteristics that identify common prop-
erty in this way: 
It seems certain that the transition to the present distinction of 
ownership did not come violently, but gradually, nature herself 
pointing out the way. For since there are some things, the use of 
which consists in their being used up, either because having be-
come part of the very substance of the user they can never be 
used again, or because by use they become less fit for future use, 
47 GROTIUS, supra note 34, at 7. 
48 Although Grotius accepted the Pope's role as arbiter between Spain and Portugal and did 
not dispute the fact that his decisions should bind those two countries between themselves, he 
also cleverly limited the Pope's role by noting that while the Pope may be the vicar of Christ 
on earth, Jesus himself declared that His kingdom was not of this world. Id. at 16 (citing Luke 
12:14; John 17:36). Therefore, Grotius reasoned, the Pope's authority should be limited to 
Christ's kingdom. Id. at 16. 
49Id. 
50 GROTIUS, supra note 34, at 2. 
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it has become apparent, especially in dealing with the first cate-
gory ... that a certain kind of ownership is inseparable from use.51 
He further reasoned that property which nature has given the inherent 
characteristics of common property should always be treated that way: 
All that which has been so constituted by nature that although 
serving one person it still suffices for the common use of all other 
persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same 
condition as when first created by nature ... [a]nd all things 
which can be used without loss to anyone else come under this 
category.52 
He then expressed the view that, "therefore, the sea can in no way 
become the private property of anyone, because nature not only al-
lows but enjoins its common use."53 
Having determined that the sea must be treated as common prop-
erty, Grotius explained that a person who limits another's use of the 
sea has no support in law,54 and he concluded that, "[s]ince navigation 
cannot harm anyone except the navigator himself ... it is only just 
that no one either can or ought to be interdicted therefrom."55 
Grotius' arguments were countered by two English scholars, John 
Selden56 and William Welwood.57 Acknowledging Grotius' work, Wel-
wood criticized it as a position fortified by the opinions and sayings of 
some old poets, orators, and philosophers, "that land and sea ... hath 
been and should bee common to all and proper to none."58 Welwood 
began his response by declaring his intent to draft 
... a simple and orderly recitation of the Holy Spirit, concerning 
the first condition natural of Land and Sea from the very begin-
ning; at which time God having and so carefully toward men 
disposed ... the Earth and Water [and] God saith to man, Subdue 
the earth and rule over the fish ... which could not be, but by a 
subduing of the waters also.59 
To Welwood, it followed naturally that as the population of the earth 
divided, "the waters became divisible, and requir[ed] a partition in 
51 [d. at 24. 
52 [d. at 27. 
53 [d. at 30. 
54 [d. at 44. 
55 [d. at 53. 
56JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM (M. Needham trans. 1972); JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAU-
SUM SEU DE DOMINO MARIS (1635). 
57 WILLIAM WELWOOD, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF ALL SEA-LAWES (1613), reprinted by De Capo 
Press, Inc. (1972). 
58 WELWOOD, supra note 57, at 61. 
59 [d. at 62. 
1993] OIL POLLUTION ACT 97 
like manner with the earth."60 To other classical writers, however, the 
connection was not quite as logical,61 and Grotius' views prevailed.62 
For nearly 350 years, the general theory of Grotius has governed 
the law of the sea, with recurrent questions regarding the breadth of 
the territorial sea.6a In spite of calls from third world countries in 1982 
for an international organization to govern all ocean uses,64 the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea largely adopted the views 
of Grotius, reaffirming the freedom of the seas.65 The convention was 
adopted in December 1982 by more than 120 countries, but the United 
States declined to sign it.66 In spite of the United States' failure to 
sign the convention, respected commentators believe many of the 
convention's provisions simply declare the state of customary inter-
national law.67 If they do, they bind all nations whether or not the 
convention is ratified.68 
The inadequacy of the law of the sea to deal effectively with the 
fast pace of developments in modern life is well recognized, however, 
and the risk of unilateral action outside the law's boundaries leading 
to international conflict has been viewed as inevitable.69 While some 
scholars view customary international law as a concept that grows 
60 Id. at 63. 
61 See Grieves, supra note 34, at 321 n.24 (indicating that the writers Richard Zoucke, Cor-
nelius van Bynkenshoek, and Christian Wolff supported Grotius' position). 
62 KINDT, supra note 2, at 11. 
63 Id.; see Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INTL L. 809 (1984) (indicating that communications between 
the Soviet Union and the United States in 1966 and 1967 concerning the expansion of the 
permissible breadth of the territorial sea without prejudice to the continued mobility of vessels 
in international straits led to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). 
64 I d. at 861. 
65 Id.; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 
U.N. Doc. AlCONF.621122 (1982), reprinted in 21I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
66 SOHN & GUSTAFSON, supra note 32, at xix; Oxman, supra note 63, at 863. 
67 SOHN & GUSTAFSON, supra note 32, at xx; Oxman supra note 63, at 810. Customary 
international law is, along with treaties and general principles, one of the three main sources of 
international law. It is created by consistent and uniform state practice, which is followed out 
of a sense of legal obligation; see Daniel Bodansky, Protecting the Marine Environment from 
Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS III and Beyond, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719 (1991). 
68 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (indicating that international law is a part of 
our law, and where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, reference must be made to the custom and usage of civilized nations); Oxman, supra 
note 63, at 810 (indicating the factors used to determine whether a particular provision actually 
declares customary international law and noting that some provisions ofUNCLOS may not have 
that status). 
69 Arvid Pardo, An Opportunity Lost, in LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA 13, 25 
(Bernard H. Oxman et al. eds., 1983). "These words are as true now as they were [in 1970]. The 
present [1982] convention is not the end but rather the beginning of a long process that must 
eventually lead to a more rational and efficient use of our environment and a more equitable 
world order." (citing U.S. Policy for the Seabed, U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL. 737 (1970». 
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slowly and only after ensuring mutual consent before action,7° others 
believe the concept is one that simply allows states obsessed with self 
interest to manipulate the law to their own advantage,71 and are not 
as cautious. Indeed, one commentator has observed that, "[ w ]hile it 
may seem paradoxical at first, unilateral action can play an important 
role in regime construction. Indeed, traditionally, the unilateral ac-
tions of great powers were major sources of regime formulation .... 
Leadership often requires someone to go first."72 
c. The Economics of Maritime Regulation 
Grotius' freedom of the seas concept has evolved through the years 
to the point that the freedom of navigation has come to mean, the 
"uninhibited liberty to transport oil and other goods over the common 
resource, the oceans, with each vessel being subject only to the juris-
diction of its flag state for all purposes on the high seas. Incidents of 
free navigation, such as pollution from ballasting and deballasting, 
[and] oil spills from collisions and stranding of ships, [become] a liabil-
ity to be borne by the international community as a whole. . . ."73 
Each nation has been free to pursue its own self interest on the oceans 
with no centralized decision-making. 74 
Under such circumstances, each decision maker has an incentive to 
exploit the resources of the common area until those resources are 
70 See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law Develapments, 
34 AM. U.L. REV. 271, 279 (1985) 
If in the last decades of the twentieth century [states] should decide that a consensus 
at a conference plus signature by a vast majority of the participants creates a general 
norm of international law, this new method of creating new principles and rules of 
international law would thereby become a legitimate method of law creation. Id. 
71 Cheng-Pang Wang, A Review of the Enfarcement Regime for Vessel-Source Oil Pollution 
Control, 16 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 305, 307--D8 (1986) (noting that the identification and 
interpretation of customary international law has been manipulated due to nations' obsession 
with self-interest). 
72 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Political Lessons of the New Law of the Sea Regime, in LAW OF THE 
SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA 113, 123 (Bernard H. Oxman et al. eds., 1983). Mr. Nye observes 
also that "the United States is the leading state in an era in which there can only be leadership 
without hegemony. As a great power we can still take unilateral initiatives, particularly if they 
are designed to help move others in the direction of multiple leadership." Id. at 122. 
73 David M. Dzidzornu & B. Martin Tsamenyi, Enhancing International Control of Vessel-
Source Oil Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982: A Reassessment, 10 U. 
TASMANIA L. REV. 269, 270 (1991). 
74 Cf Oxman, supra note 63, at 861 (indicating that before UNCLOS "[t]here were widespread 
calls for a global organization with comprehensive powers over all ocean uses, pressures for the 
declaration of zones of peace, demands for seabed demilitarization and restrictions on subma-
rines, nuclear power, and nuclear weapons, and bold assertions (paraphrasing Shakespeare) that 
we came to bury Grotius, not to praise him." 
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completely exhausted.75 This motivation and its concomitant results 
present such a classic problem in the field of economics that it has a 
commonly understood name, "the tragedy of the commons."76 This 
phenomenon leaves "all decision makers worse off than they would 
have been had they been able to agree collectively on a different set 
of policies."77 
A corollary of the tragedy of the commons principle is that the costs 
of pollution are often "externalized."78 This occurs whenever the de-
cisions of one economic actor directly affect the utility of others.79 By 
its nature, the use of environmental resources causes complex exter-
nalities.80 When a pollution problem occurs within one jurisdiction, 
domestic legislation can usually force the polluter to "internalize the 
externalities,"81 or assume the burden of "indirect social costs associ-
ated with the production of goods or services."82 
More serious problems develop, however, when pollution has its 
source in one country and its environmental effects in another.&'! In 
75 John W. Kindt, Inte'rIWtional Environmental Law and Policy: An Overview of Transboun-
dary Pollution, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 584 (1986). 
76 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
77 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(quoting Richard B. Stewart, Pymmids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211 (1977), and 
indicating that the solution lies in some mandate, from a superior power or by agreement, with 
sanctions to compel performance). 
78 Kindt, supm note 75, at 587. By this process, polluters shift the costs of avoiding or cleaning 
up pollution to others. See id. 
79 WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 10-11 (1979). 
80 HIRSCH, supm note 79, at 234-35; see JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & JAMES E. HICKEY, JR., ENERGY 
LAW AND POLICY 36 (1989) (indicating that pollution is a classic example of a harmful externality 
that imposes costs on society). 
81 HIRSCH, supra note 79, at 234. Perhaps the principal method used to date is the response 
proposed by English economist Arthur C. Pigou in which a tax on each unit produced should 
be imposed equal in size to the damage being generated. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS 
OF WELFARE 197 (1952). Pigou reasoned that: 
Divergences between private and social net product of the kind we have so far been 
considering cannot ... be mitigated by a modification of the contractual relations 
between any two contracting parties, because the divergence arises out of a service or 
disservice rendered to persons other than the contracting parties. It is, however, 
possible for the state if it so chooses, to remove the divergence in any field by 
extraordinary encouragements or extraordinary restraints upon investment in that 
field. The most obvious forms which these encouragements and methods may assume 
are, of course, those of bounties and taxes. Id. 
See CHARLES S. PEARSON, INTERNATIONAL MARINE ENVIRONMENT POLICY: THE ECONOMIC 
DIMENSION 19-21 (1975) (describing how moving from a common property regime to private 
property regime can have same effect). 
82 Barbara White, Coose and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 
577 (1987). 
83 WILHELMUS A. HAFKAMP, ECONOMIC-ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING IN A NATIONAL-RE-
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these cases, the countries must accept their collective responsibilities 
to each other and enter into regional environmental arrangements to 
solve transboundary pollution problems.84 This arrangement has be-
come commonplace.85 While the agreements undoubtedly benefit the 
global environment, an individual country may have reasons not to 
cooperate.86 
More importantly, the international agreements that exist to pro-
tect the maritime environment are difficult, if not impossible, to en-
force.87 Additionally, U.S. laws enacted to deal with water pollution 
have been carefully circumscribed by these international conven-
tions,88 and may be further limited by a presumption that they apply 
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.89 This 
presumption has been interpreted to apply very stringently when 
questions of environmental law are addressed.90 
GIONAL SYSTEM (1984); KINDT, supra note 2, at 588 (indicating that developing countries are 
unlikely to impose strict environmental regulations because they prefer to encourage shipping 
interests); see Matthew Lippman, Transnational Corporations and Repressive Regimes: The 
Ethical Dilemma, 15 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 542, 545 (1985) (stating that third world countries often 
have limited resources or ability to control the activities of multinational corporations); Stephen 
J. Darrnody, Note, An Economic Approach to Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Requested 
by U.S. Multinational Corporations-The Bhopal Case, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 
215 (1988) (recommending that U.S. courts refuse to grant forum non conveniens dismissals 
when requested by U.S. multinational corporations whose tortious behavior has imposed exter-
nalities in a third world country). 
84 KINDT, supra note 2, at 588. Accord National Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 56 F.2d 
at 1378. Cf Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (arguing that 
private negotiation will lead to the most economically efficient result but recognizing that when 
there is a large number of injured persons, the transaction costs involved make it unworkable); 
PEARSON, supra note 81, at 22-23 (arguing that under such circumstances it is appropriate to 
extend some national rights over ocean resources). 
85 Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental 
RelJUlation, 30 HARV. INTL L.J. 421 (1989). 
86 See id. at 429 (explaining how the "prisoner's dilemma" may operate to provide any indi-
vidual country with a competitive advantage in industrial production by "enjoying the benefits 
of other countries' environmental protection activities, while taking limited action at horne" and 
identifying a number of other factors that may playa part); KINDT, supra note 2, at 587 (citing 
Walter, Environmental Management and the International Economic Order, in THE FUTURE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 324-25 (C. Bergsten 
ed., 1973) (indicating that the pressure on developing countries to industrialize rapidly causes 
them to intentionally sacrifice their ecosystems)). 
87 See, e.g., Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73. 
88 Bodansky, supra note 67, at 764-71; Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, at 280-87. 
89 See Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 
(1991) (requiring congressional intent to be clearly expressed before applying a law extraterri-
torially); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (same). 
90 Jonathan Turley, "When In Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 629-32 (1990) analyzing Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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II. THE LAW BEFORE THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 
A. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas 
From 1633 to 1958 Hugo Grotius' freedom of the seas governed; the 
only restraint was the concept of "abuse of rights," which ensures that 
states use the seas reasonably with due consideration to the rights of 
other users.91 In 1958, when the Geneva Conference codified the law 
of the sea,92 ocean pollution and its concomitant economic conse-
quences were not recognized as costs that nations must eventually 
assume.93 Instead, the 1958 Convention of the High Seas simplyac-
knowledged the right of each state to extend its nationality to ships 
flying its flag.94 In so doing, it gave the "flag state" sole jurisdiction to 
institute legal processes against its vessels if they were involved in 
an incident on the high seas.95 Coastal states were allowed to protect 
the living resources of the sea96 but only because those resources were 
subject to exploitation by all states.97 The convention ensured that the 
coastal state would not "abuse its rights."98 
B. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
From Ships (MARPOL) 
1. The Convention 
After the 1958 Convention was completed, those in charge of its 
negotiation asked the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or-
ganization (IMCO), now the Intergovernmental Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO), to develop a set of rules and standards capable of working 
within the international law regime to prevent marine oil pollution 
from vessels.99 The IMO responded by amending a pre-existing con-
vention, the 1954 Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
91 Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, at 272. 
92 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29,1958,13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into 
force Sept. 30, 1962) (containing a preamble that declares it is "generally declaratory of estab-
lished principles of international law") [hereinafter 1958 Convention]. 
93 Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, at 273; John W. Kindt, Prolegomenon to Marine 
Pollution and the Law of the Sea: An Overview of the Pollution Problem, 11 ENVTL. L. 67, 
90-92 (1980-81). 
94 Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, at 272 (citing 1958 Convention, supra note 92, art. 
5, at 2314). 
95 [d. (citing 1958 Convention, supra note 92, arts. 10-11, at 2316). 
96 [d. at 273. 
97 [d. 
98 See id. at 274. 
99 [d. at 275. 
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by Oil (OILPOL 54), several timesYlO OILPOL 54 was eventually 
superseded by the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution by Ships and its 1978 Protocol (MARPOL).lOl 
MARPOL defines its goals as achieving the complete elimination of 
intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harm-
ful substances and minimizing the accidental discharge of such sub-
stances.102 To meet these goals, MARPOL established in its Annex I, 
twenty-five complex regulations governing the construction, design, 
and equipment of vessels.lo3 One of these regulations requires states 
of registry to issue certificates of compliance with the requirements 
of Annex 1.104 The Convention then requires each party to pass do-
mestic laws prohibiting violations of the Convention and providing 
sanctions for those violations.105 Whenever a ship required to hold a 
certificate is in a foreign port, it is subject to inspection by port state 
officialsY16 That inspection is limited to verifying that there is a valid 
certificate on board when there are clear grounds to believe the ship 
does not meet the requirements for the certificate.107 Parties to the 
Convention are required to cooperate in the detection of violations 
and the enforcement of the Convention.lOs A port state that finds a 
violation is required to report its findings to the vessel's flag state.109 
100 [d. OILPOL 54 was the first multilateral instrument concluded with the prime objective 
of protecting the environment and preserving the seas and coastal environment from pollution. 
See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, Nov. 2,1973, reprinted 
in 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter MARPOL 73]. 
101 MARPOL 73, supra note 100, at 1319; see Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973, Feb. 16, 1978, reprinted in 17 
I.L.M. 546 (1978) [hereinafter MARPOL]. The 1973 Convention was never ratified by the United 
States or by a sufficient number of other states to allow it to come into force by itself. It was, 
however, modified by and incorporated into the 1978 Protocol, which was adopted on February 
17,1978, and ratified by the Senate on July 2,1980. H.R. Rep. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4849, 4850. 
1(r.! H.R. Rep. No. 1224 at 2-6. 
103 MARPOL 73, supra note 100, Annex I, at 1335-71. 
104 [d., Annex I, ch. I, reg. 5, at 1340-42. 
106 [d., art. 4, at 1322. 
106 [d., art. 5, at 1322-23. 
107 [d., art. 6, at 1323-24. If this is the case, the ship shall not be allowed to sail until it can 
proceed to sea without presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. 
[d. 
106 [d. 
100 [d. But see id., art. 5(3) (indicating that when a party acting aR a port state denies a foreign 
ship access or "takes any action against such a ship for the reason that the ship does not comply 
with the present Convention, the party shall immediately inform the consul or diplomatic 
representative of the Party whose flag the ship is entitled to fly"). This leaves open the question 
of what "action" may be taken by the port state and under what circumstances. Other provisions 
of the Convention, though, indicate that the term "jurisdiction" in MARPOL "shall be construed 
in ... light of international law in force at the time of application or interpretation of the present 
[c]onvention." [d., art. 9(3). These provisions also indicate that nothing in MARPOL shall 
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If the port state unduly delays the ship, it will be liable for any losses 
or damages suffered.l1O 
The 1954 Convention and the IMO regimes combined to strengthen 
Grotius' concept of the freedom of the seas, deferring to the jurisdic-
tion of a vessel's flag state at every opportunity.111 The limited port 
state and coastal state jurisdictions have never become effective en-
forcement tools, largely because many of these states became "flag of 
convenience" states and adopted lax anti-pollution measures.l12 
2. United States Implementation 
There are inherent weaknesses in MARPOL. Perhaps the greatest 
of these is its absolute deference in enforcement to the individual flag 
states.U3 In addition to MARPOUs limits, the nations of the world 
must work within the restrictions imposed on them by the interna-
tional law of the sea. Unlike the vessel-source pollution standards 
established by international agreement, the jurisdictional rights and 
duties of states have been defined primarily by customary interna-
tional law.1l4 It was the limitations of international law that led Con-
gress to pass a cautious interpretation of MARPOL, the Act to Pre-
vent Pollution From Ships.l15 That Act applies to ships of the United 
States wherever located,116 ships registered in a country that is party 
to the MARPOL Protocol while in the navigable waters of the United 
States,117 and, as amended in 1987 with respect to regulations govern-
ing the disposal of garbage, those same ships within the navigable 
waters or the exclusive economic zone of the United States.n8 
Moreover, the criminal provisions of the Act require a knowing 
prejudice either the development of the law of the sea by the U.N. Conference (which eventually 
led to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea), or "the present or future claims and legal 
views of any [s]tate concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag 
[s]tate jurisdiction." Id., art. 9(2). 
lIO Id., art. 7. 
m Both OILPOL and MARPOL were adopted in part to reduce the threat of unilateral coastal 
state regulation. Bodansky, supra note 67, at 727. 
lI2Mark L. Boos, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Striking the Flags of Convenience? 2 COLO. 
J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'y 407 (1991); Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, at 279. 
lI3 MARPOL 73, supra note 100, art. 4. 
lI4 Bodansky, supra note 67, at 727; see the discussion of customary internationailaw, supra 
notes 67-72, and accompanying text. 
116 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (1988). 
lI633 U .S.C. § 1902(a)(I) (1988). 
117 33 U .S.C. § 1902(a)(2) (1988). 
lI833 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(3) (1988). Before 1987, this section read "(3) a ship registered in or of 
the nationality of a country not a party to the MARPOL Protocol ... while in the navigable 
waters of the United States." See the discussion of the exclusive economic zone, infra notes 
140-48 and accompanying text. 
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violation of the MARPOL protocols before the person who has com-
mitted the violation may be found guilty.l19 As required by MARPOL, 
the Act also provides for referring violations of ships registered in a 
country that is party to the MARPOL Protocol back to that country 
rather than taking enforcement action in the V nited States.120 
C. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
MARPOL specifically provides for changes in the international law 
framework within which its protocols are interpreted.121 This is true 
whether the growth occurs as a result of the then-pending V.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (VNCLOS or 1982 Convention)122 
or through the legal interpretations of any state regarding the nature 
and extent of coastal state jurisdiction.123 
Negotiations leading to VNCLOS began during the Nixon admini-
stration in 197V2A The Convention was completed in 1982125 but has 
never been signed by the V nited Statesl26 and has not yet come into 
force. 127 While some of the Convention's provisions have been ac-
cepted as declaratory of customary international law,128 substantial 
questions remain on certain provisions,I29 especially regarding the 
limits imposed on coastal states' rights.1ao Nevertheless, the Conven-
119 33 U.S.C. § 1008(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
100 This section merely provides, however, that the Secretary may refer the matter to the flag 
state. 33 U.S.C. § 1908(0 (1988). 
121 See supra note 107. 
122 MARPOL 73, supra note 100, art. 9(2). 
123 [d., art. 9(3). 
124 But see supra note 63 (indicating that informal communications began in 1966 and 1967). 
12D United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. 
Doc. NCONF.621122 (1982) reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS or 1982 
Convention]. 
1l!l; Bodansky, supra note 67, at 723. 
127 [d. at 723 n.ll (explaining that only fifty of the sixty states required for the Convention to 
come into force had ratified it by March, 1991). 
128 [d. at 723 n.12 (explaining that the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law says 
UNCLOS's provisions on the protection of the marine environment reflect customary interna-
tionallaw but citing others who disagree). 
129 See William T. Burke, Customary Law of the Sea: Advocacy or Disinterested Scholarship? 
14 YALE J. INT'L L. 508, 509-12 (1989); see also Jose L. Vallarta, Protection and Preservation 
of the Marine Environment and Marine Scientific Research at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1983). 
130 For the view that the growth of coastal state powers included in the 1982 Convention have 
gained consensus for changes in the customary international law of the sea but that there is no 
similar consensus on the limits of coastal states' rights imposed by UNCLOS, and that, "[t]hese 
provisions can spell the difference between enjoying and losing high seas freedoms of navigation 
... in forty percent of the world's oceans," see Nye, supra note 72, at 119 (quoting Ambassador 
Elliot Richardson). 
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tion has become a common reference point for discussions of marine 
environmental jurisdiction.131 
One of the most pervasive themes of the Convention is the freedom 
of high seas navigation. Indeed, the United States made it known that 
it would not accept any agreement that did not ensure the freedom 
of passage through international straits.132 This position was largely 
justified by the United States' national security interests in protect-
ing itself and projecting its naval power around the world.133 Before 
1970, the United States preferred to maintain a world-wide rule of 
three-mile territorial seasl34 to ensure that no coastal state could 
interfere with the navigation of U.S. vessels. It learned, however, that 
a proposed new conference on the law of the sea could lead to the 
compromise of navigation freedoms, which the United States believed 
ran counter to its interests.l35 
To preserve navigational freedoms, President Nixon proposed a 
package in the spring of 1971 in which the United States agreed to 
extend territorial seas to twelve miles in exchange for a guarantee 
that wherever two nations' territorial seas overlapped in international 
straits, the right of free transit through those straits would be pre-
served. On that condition, he agreed to engage in an effort to draft a 
new law of the sea treaty.136 
The 1982 Convention provides that the specific obligations assumed 
by states under special conventions such as MARPOL should be 
carried out in a manner consistent with UNCLOS.137 It then codifies 
the duties of flag states, coastal states, and port statesl38 and provides 
a framework within which these states may regulate to protect and 
preserve the marine environment.139 Significantly, the Convention 
defines an area beyond the territorial sea as the exclusive economic 
131 Bodansky, supra note 67, at 723. 
132 Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Passage Through International Straits: A Right Preserved in 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 801 (1980). 
133 See id. at 801 n.2 (noting that while he will not dispute this concern, others have observed 
that the improved range and sophistication of U.S. submarines would allow our defenses to 
function without compromise even absent guarantees of passage); see also H. Gary Knight, The 
1971 United States Proposals on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and Passage Through 
International Straits, 51 OR L. REV. 759, 776--82 (1972). 
134 The territorial sea of a coastal nation is that band of ocean surrounding the nation over 
which the nation may exercise complete sovereignty. See UNCLOS, supra note 65, arts. 2, 3. 
135 See Robertson, supra note 132, 802-{)5; see also Knight, supra note 133. 
136 Robertson, supra note 132, at 806 (citing the President's Statement on United States Ocean 
Policy, 6 Weekly Compo of Pres. Doc. 677, 678 (May 25, 1970)). 
137 UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. 237. 
138 See generally id., Part II; see also Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, at 280-87. 
139 See generally UNCLOS, supra note 65, arts. 192-237. 
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zone, in which the coastal state has sovereign rights to conserve and 
manage natural resources.140 The United States has claimed an exclu-
sive economic zone of 200 miles in breadth.141 
Within the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has jurisdic-
tion to control pollution through prescriptive and enforcement mecha-
nisms.142 That jurisdiction must be exercised, however, with due re-
gard for the rights and duties of other states143 and is specifically 
subject to the paramount freedom of navigation on the high seas.l44 
The Convention establishes an enforcement scheme for violations 
of pollution laws and regulations.145 Each vessel's flag state retains 
primary enforcement responsibility and must ensure that vessels fly-
ing its flag comply with applicable rules and standards, wherever a 
violation occurs.146 Flag states are required under MARPOL to issue 
certificates of compliance with applicable law. UNCLOS, in turn, re-
quires other states to accept those certificates as evidence of the 
condition of the vessel, unless there are clear grounds to believe the 
vessel's condition does not correspond with the certificate.147 UN-
CLOS also adopts the MARPOL system of referring complaints to a 
vessel's flag state for investigation.l48 
Port state authority is more specific under UNCLOS.149 Port states 
have specific authority to investigate and institute proceedings 
against vessels voluntarily within their ports or at offshore terminals, 
when evidence indicates that the vessel has caused an unlawful dis-
charge outside the internal waters, territorial sea, or exclusive eco-
nomic zone of that state.150 These proceedings may only be initiated 
at the request of the state in whose waters the discharge occurred, 
the vessel's flag state, or a state damaged or threatened by the un-
lawful discharge.151 Further, if the coastal state desires to pursue the 
investigation, the port state must transmit all its evidence, and any 
financial security posted by the vessel, to the requesting state.l52 
140 See genemlly id., Part IV. 
141 UNCLOS Art. 57; Proclamation No. 5030 (Mar. 10, 1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
A 18-29. 
142 Dzidzomu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, at 280. 
143 I d. at 273. 
144 UNCLOS, supra note 65, arts. 58, 87,211(4). 
145 See genemlly id. arts. 217, 218, 220. 
146 ld. art. 217(1). 
1471d. art. 217(3). 
148 ld. art. 217(4)-217(8). 
149 UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. 218. 
150 ld. art. 218(1). 
151 ld. art. 218(2). 
152 ld. art. 218(4). 
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Perhaps most significant in the enforcement scheme is the recogni-
tion and delimitation of the coastal state's role in enforcement pro-
ceedings under UNCLOS. Article 220 first gives the coastal state 
authority to institute proceedings against a vessel that is voluntarily 
within a port or at an offshore terminal of that state for any violation 
of its laws or regulations. If those laws are designed to address 
violations occurring in the coastal state's territorial sea or exclusive 
economic zone, the laws must be adopted either in accordance with 
UNCLOS or other applicable international rules and standards for 
the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from vessels. l53 
The Convention then carefully circumscribes the authority it 
grants. Specifically, before a coastal state may physically inspect a 
vessel navigating in its territorial sea, the state needs clear grounds 
to believe the vessel violated either laws and regulations adopted by 
the coastal state in accordance with UNCLOS or the applicable inter-
national rules and standards. Only if the evidence discovered during 
that inspection so warrants may the coastal state detain the vessel 
and institute proceedings against it.154 Similarly, if a coastal state has 
clear grounds for believing a vessel navigating in its territorial sea or 
exclusive economic zone violated applicable law while in the exclusive 
economic zone, the state may only require the vessel to give informa-
tion regarding its identity, port of registry, last and next ports of call, 
and other relevant information needed to determine whether a viola-
tion has in fact occurred. 155 
When a state has clear grounds for believing a ship committed a 
violation in the exclusive economic zone resulting in a "substantial 
discharge causing or threatening significant pollution of the marine 
environment," and the vessel either refuses to provide information or 
provides information at variance with the evident facts, that state 
may physically inspect the vesseU56 Under similar circumstances, if 
the violation results in a discharge causing major damage or threat of 
major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal state, 
or to any resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone, 
that state may institute proceedings, including detention of the ves-
sel.157 
All of these coastal state enforcement measures are subject to the 
limits of Articles 223 through 234. These articles provide, among other 
153 [d. art. 220(1). 
154 [d. art. 220(2). 
155 [d. art. 220(3). 
156 [d. art. 220(5). 
157 [d. art. 220(6). 
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things, that states shall not delay a foreign vessel longer than is 
essential for any authorized investigation,158 and that investigations 
shall be conducted within certain limits that are generally deferential 
to flag state authority.l59 These articles further provide that the flag 
state shall be notified whenever a coastal state takes any enforcement 
measures against a foreign vessel/50 and that only monetary penalties 
may be imposed for pollution violations beyond the territorial seal6l 
or those within the territorial sea unless there is evidence of a willful 
and serious act of pollution in the territorial seayi2 
D. Enforcement of u.s. Pollution Laws 
Before the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, United States domestic law 
reflected the international law's deference to regulation by the flag 
state. United States law, however, was not as well coordinated. It 
offered a haphazard collection of laws, none of which was tailored to 
adequately address a marine oil spill.163 It was with these inadequate 
tools that the Justice Department was asked to prosecute Exxon after 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill.1M During the Exxon Valdez litigation, the 
weaknesses of our then-existing legal system became evident. 165 
Among the most significant weaknesses were the absence of oil within 
the Clean Water Act's definition of "pollutant"l66 and the absence of a 
criminal provision in the Clean Water Act punishing those who spill 
oiU67 
168 [d. art. 226(1). 
159 [d. 
100 [d. art. 23l. 
161 [d. art. 230(1). 
162 [d. art. 230(2). 
163 S. Rep. No. 94, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1989) (discussing the Clean Water Act, the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, the Deepwater Ports Act, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act, and the Limitation of Liability Act, and observing how they provide varying 
and uneven liability standards and scopes of coverage for cleanup costs and damages). 
164 See generally Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes far Environmental Polluters: The 
Exxon Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147 (1992). 
165 Due to the weaknesses in the Clean Water Act, Exxon was charged with committing two 
strict liability misdemeanors by violating the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467n (1988), and the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-718 (1988). Then, using the Criminal Fine Im-
provements Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571, the government was able to threaten Exxon with the 
potential for billions of dollars in criminal liability. [d. at 148. 
166 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1988). 
1117 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988) (providing criminal penalties for any person who violates 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, 1345, or any permit conditions under 1342 or 1344). It 
was not until the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that § 1319(c) was amended to provide a criminal 
penalty for violating 1321(b)(3). See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4301(c), 104 
Stat. 484, 537. 
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The absence of oil in the definition of pollutant is only under-
standable after realizing that what is now codified as the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1386, incorporated as 33 U.S.C. § 1321, the 
former Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.168 The Water Quality 
Improvement Act preceded the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
and created a system to ensure responsible parties paid to clean up 
the oil and hazardous materials they spilled into U.S. waters. Its only 
provision for criminal liability was for a failure to report an oil spill.l69 
Section 1321 does provide, however, for strict liability for oil SpillSl70 
from vesselsl71 whether they occur within the navigable waters of the 
United States or beyond the territorial sea.172 The Act only provides 
for monetary penalties, however, in accordance with both UNCLOS 
and MARPOL,173 
The Clean Water Act, in contrast, developed along a different path. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA) was the 
culmination of a series of frustrating attempts to balance federal 
control of clean water with states' rights.174 As passed, the Act incor-
porated the Rivers and Harbors Act's prohibitions and permit re-
quirements and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970. The 
federal government assumed a dominant role in directing the water 
pollution control program in the country.175 
The FWPCA has been amended and refined by the Clean Water 
Act of 1977176 and the Water Quality Act of 1987.177 Since 1972, how-
168 This statute was enacted largely in response to the oil spill from an oil production platform 
off the coast of Santa Barbara in January 1969. Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollutian Act of 1990: 
Its Promsions, Intent, and Effects, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10119 n.3 (1991). Under this section, the 
predecessor of the present Superfund scheme, the person responsible for a spill of oil or 
hazardous substances must notify the federal government, which is authorized to remove the 
pollution, assess the costs of removal to the owner or operator, and assess civil penalties. 
CHARLES QPENCHOWSKI, A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 171 
(1990). 
169 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1988 & Supp. 111990). 
170 33 U .S.C. § 1321(a)(I), (f) (1988 & Supp.II 1990). 
171 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(3), (b)(5) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
172 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
173 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6), (b)(7), (e), (f), (i) (1988 & Supp. II 1990); see supra notes 122-23 and 
accompanying text. 
174 See Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (requiring public 
hearings to resolve disputes but providing no civil or criminal penalties); Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat. 498 (strengthening the states' 
role); Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (imposing heavy burdens of 
proof on the federal government that made it difficult to enforce the law). 
175 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. 
176 Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. 
177 Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7. 
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ever, it has focused on prohibiting the discharge of any pollutant by 
any person, except as prescribed by a permit issued under the N a-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). Section 
309178 punishes unpermitted discharges with civil and criminal sanc-
tions.179 
In prosecuting Exxon for the Valdez spill, the government was 
forced to turn its back on section 1321, the section that clearly deals 
with oil spills, since that section provided no criminal penalties.180 
Instead, the United States argued that the discharge of oil violated 
the section 301181 prohibition on the discharge of pollutants without a 
permit.t82 By doing so, the government hoped to take advantage of 
the fact that section 309183 makes the negligent violation of section 
301184 a misdemeanor.185 The principal legal hurdles were whether oil 
could be considered a pollutant, the discharge of which is prohibited 
by section 301, and whether a vessel could be considered a point 
source.l86 
While oil is clearly listed as a prohibited substance in section 311,187 
it is not included in the Clean Water Act's general definition of a 
pollutant.188 Despite this omission, the only court to have dealt with 
the question directly read the term pollutant to include oil.189 The 
court in the Exxon Valdez case relied on the Hamel court's reasoning 
and found that oil is a pollutant for purposes of section 301.190 
The next question for the Exxon Valdez court was whether a vessel 
is a point source under the law. Because vessels are specifically listed 
178 33 u.s.C. § 1319 (1988 & Supp. 11). 
179 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1319, 1342 (1988 & Supp. 111990). 
18) 33 u.s.c. § 1321 (1988 & Supp. 111990). This was necessary because § 1319 did not make 
a violation of § 1321 a criminal offense. 
181 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988). 
182 Raucher, supra note 164, at 157-58. 
182 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
184 "Except as in compliance with this section and section ... 1342 ... the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988). 
186 "Any person who negligently violates section 1311 ... shall be punished by a fine ... or by 
imprisonment .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (Supp II 1990). 
186 Raucher, supra note 164, at 158. 
187 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1988). 
188 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1988) (defining "pollutant" to mean dredged spoil, solid waste incinera-
tor residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical waste, biological materials, 
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and indus-
trial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into the water). 
189 United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 109-11 (6th Cir. 1977) (reasoning that oil is a 
"biological material" and that the Clean Water Act was intended to be at least as inclusive in 
its prohibitions as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407, which includes oil). See 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966). 
190 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988). See Raucher, supra note 164, at 159 (citing 2 OIL SPILL LITIG. 
NEWS at 2280-81. 
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as point sources in the statute,191 the court refused to grant Exxon's 
motion to dismiss on these grounds.192 
Thus, while courts such as the Exxon Valdez court have been able 
to surmount the technical details193 of the Clean Water Act's confusing 
structure to support the Act's objective,194 doing so has required them 
to overlook the reality that the NPDES permit system and section 
311195 were designed independently to serve different needs.l96 Once 
a court has ruled that section 301197 covers oil spills, any such spill 
must be addressed in an NPDES permit. Because it seems extraor-
dinarily unlikely that a vessel would request, or that EPA would 
issue, an NPDES permit for an accidental oil spill of an unknown 
substance, such a reading carried to its logical limits requires a court 
to find that section 301198 covers all unintentional spills. Without a 
permit, any unintentional spill will violate section 301.199 This inter-
pretation imposes, in effect, strict criminal liability for unintentional 
oil spills from vessels.20o 
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of this construction of the stat-
ute, however, is that it leads to inconsistent results under different 
circumstances.201 Specifically, because the statute provides that the 
term "discharge of a pollutant" includes any addition of any pollutant 
to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point 
source other than a vessel or other floating craft,202 vessels could not 
be criminally liable for any spill beyond three miles from shore. Under 
the Hamel and Exxon Valdez interpretation of the statute, however, 
ships are subject to strict criminal liability for unintentional oil spills 
in the internal waters or the territorial sea of the United States.203 
191 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988». 
192 Raucher, supra note 164, at 160 (citing 2 OIL SPILL LITIG. NEWS at 2281--82). 
193 Some would put it more strongly. See Randle, supra note 168, at 10131 (indicating that 
until 1990, the only criminal charge that could be brought for discharges into the navigable 
waters was that of discharging without a permit). 
194 To restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). 
195 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988). 
196 The Exxon court specifically rejected this argument. See Raucher, supra note 164, at 161 
citing 2 OIL SPILL LITIG. NEWS at 1958-59. 
197 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988). 
198Id. 
199 Raucher, supra note 164, at 16I. 
200Id. (observing that "if Congress intended this fairly draconian result ... it chose a particu-
larly circuitous route to achieve its goal"). 
201 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988) (relied upon by the Hamel and Exxon courts) with 
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988). 
202 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988). 
203 Assuming Congress intended the courts to interpret the Clean Water Act as it was 
interpreted by the Hamel and Exxon courts, the results would closely mirror those required 
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The most appropriate statute for addressing marine oil spills, how-
ever, the Water Quality Act of 1970, now codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1321, 
provides a comprehensive scheme for regulating oil spills in all waters 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction that is consistent with internationallaw.204 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. LAW 
A. New Criminal Provisions for the Clean Water Act 
1. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
Whatever problems or weaknesses the Clean Water Act might have 
had in dealing with oil spills were solved with the passage of the Oil 
Pollution Act.205 That Act was the culmination of a nearly fifteen year 
effort to consolidate the federal response mechanisms for oil spills.206 
For a number of reasons, Congress had been unable to reach a con-
sensus on the best approach to take.207 When the Exxon Valdez ran 
aground on Bligh Reef and began spilling 10.8 million gallons of crude 
oil into Prince William Sound in Alaska, public outrage broke the 
Congressional deadlock and led to one of the United States' most 
significant environmental statutes,208 with the unmistakable purpose 
of preventing future Valdez-style disasters.209 
The Oil Pollution Act has nine main elements: 
1) a comprehensive federal liability scheme, addressing all dis-
charges of oil to navigable waters, the exclusive economic zone, and 
shorelines;21o 
2) a single, unified federal fund, called the Oil Spill Liability 'lhlst Fund, 
to pay for the cleanup and other costs of federal response to oil spills;211 
by international law. International law allows a coastal state to impose more than monetary 
penalties for violations committed by other nations' vessels in the coastal states territorial sea 
but not beyond. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. Under UNCLOS, however, that 
liability must be premised upon willful and serious acts of pollution, not strictly imposed criminal 
liability. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
204 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1988) (adopting a regulatory regime that deals with oil spills in 
the various areas of the ocean according to the requirements of the international law of the sea). 
206 Oil Pollution Act of 1990 §§ 1001-9002; 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. II 1990). 
206 Including the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), The Deepwater 
Port Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), the Trans Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
tion Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1988), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331-1374 (1988), and CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Randle, 
supra note 168, at 10119. 
2(11 Grumbles, supra note 3, at 1584)3 (1991); Randle, supra note 168, at 10119. 
2~ Grumbles, supra note 3, at 153-55. 
200 Randle, supra note 168, at 10119-20. 
210 Oil Pollution Act, §§ 1001-1020 (1990). 
211 [d. § 9001. 
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3) stronger federal authority to order removal action or to conduct 
the removal action itself;212 
4) new controls for prevention of spills and plans to control spills 
that must be drafted by the owners or operators of onshore facilities, 
offshore facilities, and vessels;213 
5) tougher criminal penalties;214 
6) higher civil penalties for spills of oil and hazardous substances;215 
7) tighter standards and reviews for licensing crews of tank vessels, 
and for equipment and operations of tank vessels, including the re-
quirement of double hulls;216 
8) no preemption of state laws and an endorsement of the United 
States' participation in a stringent international oil spill liability and 
compensation scheme;217 and, 
9) several provisions pertinent to Prince William Sound, to Alaska 
at large, and to other portions of the United States.218 
2. The Structure of the Criminal Provisions 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Oil Pollution Act is its 
adoption of tougher criminal penalties.219 Equally important is the 
manner Congress chose to implement them.220 With one sentence in 
the Oil Pollution Act, Congress changed the nature of liability for oil 
spills in the United States, and possibly the world.221 That simple 
212 [d. § 4201. 
213 [d. § 4202. 
214 [d. § 4301. 
215 [d. §§ 4301, 4302. 
216 [d. §§ 4101-4115. 
217 [d. § 1018. 
218 [d. §§ 5001-5007. 
219 Arguably adopted because: 
The penalties available to the federal government under section 311 (33 U .s.C. § 1321) 
to punish unpermitted discharges of oil and hazardous substances had not been sig-
nificantly amended since the early 19708. Given the damages inflicted by the Valdez 
spill, the available penalties looked too weak, especially in comparison with other 
penalties of the Clean Water Act and other environmental statutes. 
Randle, supra note 168, at 10130. 
220 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 4301(c). The Conference report for this provision reads: 
Section 4301(c) of the Conference substitute provides that violations of the prohibition 
of oil or hazardous substances are subject to criminal penalties established under 
section 309(c) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [the Clean Water Act]. These 
penalties are $2,500-$25,000/one year in prison for negligent violations, $5,000-
$50,OOO/three years for knowing violations, and up to $250,000 and 15 years for knowing 
endangerment. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 430-431 at 154 (1990) reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 779, 833. 
221 See supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text. See also infra Part IV and accompanying 
text. 
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sentence reads, "Section 309(c) of the Federal Water Pollution Act (33 
U.S.C. 1319(c» is amended by inserting after '308,' each place it ap-
pears the following: 311(b)(3)."222 
With this amendment from the Oil Pollution Act, the criminal pro-
vision of the Federal Water Pollution Act2Z3 would read as follows: 
(c) Criminal penalties 
(1) Negligent violations 
Any person who ... negligently violates section ... 1321(b)(3) ... 
of this title ... shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor 
more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not 
more than 1 year, or by both. If a conviction of a person is for a violation 
committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, 
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of 
violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or by both.224 
(2) Knowing violations 
Any person who ... knowingly violates section ... 1321(b)(3) ... of 
this title ... shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor 
more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not 
more than 3 years, or by both. If a conviction of a person is for a 
violation committed after a first conviction of such person under this 
paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $100,000 
per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or 
by both.225 
(3) Knowing endangerment 
Any person who ... knowingly violates section ... 1321(b)(3) ... of 
this title ... and who knows at the time that he thereby places 
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, 
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $250,000 
or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both. A person which 
is an organization shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not 
more than $1,000,000. If a conviction of a person is for a violation 
committed after a first conviction of such person under this para-
graph, the maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect to 
both fines and imprisonment.226 
222 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380 § 4301(c), 104 Stat. 484, 537. 
223 In the unofficial codification process, § 311(b )(3) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
became known as 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3). The Oil Pollution Act's directive regarding § 311(b)(3) 
is thus referred to as § 1321(b)(3) in the codified version. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1) (West 
Supp. 1992). 
224 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (Supp.II 1990). 
225 [d. § 1319(c)(2). 
226 [d. § 1319(c)(3)(A). 
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Thus, through one simple sentence in the Oil Pollution Act, the 
Congress caused severe criminal sanctions to attach to violations of 
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3). That section provides: 
(3) The discharge of oil or hazardous substances 
(i) into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining 
shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone, or 
(ii) ... which may affect natural resources belonging to, appertain-
ing to, or under the exclusive management of the United States 
(including resources under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act227) in such quantities as may be harmful as deter-
mined by the President under paragraph (4) of this subsection is 
prohibited, except 
(A) in the case of such discharges into the waters of the contiguous 
zone or which may affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining 
to, or under the exclusive management authority of the United States 
(including resources under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act), where permitted under the Protocol of 1978 Re-
lating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, 1973 and 
(B) where permitted in quantities and at times and locations or 
under such circumstances or conditions as the President may, by 
regulation, determine not to be harmful. Any regulations issued under 
this subsection shall be consistent with maritime safety and with 
marine and navigation laws and regulations and applicable water 
quality standards.228 
3. The Breadth of the New Provisions 
By virtue of the manner in which Congress adopted criminal pen-
alties for oil spills, incorporating section 1321(b)(3) from the old Water 
Quality Improvement Act229 into section 1319(c) of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act,230 it grafted one well-developed body of law 
onto another.231 
Certain principles have evolved through interpreting each section 
that are worth noting.232 The first is that under section 1321(b)(3) the 
227 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988) (providing jurisdiction over the living resources of the 
continental shelf out to 200 nautical miles). 
228 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1988). 
229 See supm notes 168-74 and accompanying text. 
230 See supm notes 174-77 and accompanying text. 
231 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.S. § 1321 (Law Co-op. 1987) and the interpretive notes following. 
232Id. 
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quantity of oil determined to be harmful is that amount that creates 
a sheen on the surface of the water.233 Second, section 1321 has its own 
definitions section, which defines terms somewhat differently than 
they are defined in the remainder of the Clean Water Act. Under this 
section, the term "discharge" includes, but is not limited to, "any 
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, or dumping" 
but excludes discharges associated with permits issued under section 
1342.234 The term "person" under section 1319 means an individual, 
corporation, partnership, association, state, municipality, commission, 
or political subdivision of a state, any interstate body,235 or a respon-
sible corporate officer.236 
B. The Expansion of Criminal Liability for Environmental 
Violations 
1. Reasons for Labeling Conduct Criminal 
a. The Policy 
The use of criminal penalties to enforce the substantive provisions 
of the Oil Pollution Act reflects a government-wide trend towards 
adopting, strengthening, and vigorously enforcing criminal provisions 
to protect the environment. In the 1970s, the cost of violating envi-
ronmental laws seemed small compared to the cost of compliance.237 
In the entire decade, only twenty-five environmental crimes cases 
were prosecuted.238 In comparison, during the seven years between 
1983 and 1990, the Department of Justice secured 569 criminal indict-
ments from which 432 convictions or guilty pleas resulted.239 In 1990 
alone, 134 indictments were returned, ninety-eight percent of which 
named corporations, presidents, owners, vice presidents, directors, 
and managers as defendants.24o These data reflect the facts that Con-
233 See, e.g., Chevron v. Yost, 919 F.2d. 27 (5th Cir. 1990); OrgulfTransport Co. v. United States, 
711 F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Ky. 1989). 
234 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (1988). Cj supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
235 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988). 
236 [d. § 1319(c)(6) (1988). 
237 Dick Thornburg, Criminal Enfarcement of Environmental Laws-A National Priority, 
59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775 (1991). 
238 F. Henry Habicht, II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enfarcement: 
How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10478, 10479 (1987). 
239 Susan A. Bernstein, Environmental Criminal Law: The Use of Confinement for Criminal 
Violatars of the Federal Clean Water Act, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 107, 
107 n.6 (1991). 
240 Thornburg, supra note 237, at 778 n.21. 
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gress enacted additional environmental legislation to control the care-
less disposal of toxic waste and that the public favored vigorous 
enforcement efforts.241 One commentator has observed that this trend 
reflects the emergence of a "New Environmental Paradigm" that 
focuses on the criminal law's ability to condemn those who violate 
society's increasingly stringent efforts to protect the environment.242 
Until Congress added a felony penalty to the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1980, environmental crimes tended 
to be relatively minor offenses associated with conservation laws.243 
Since then, however, virtually every major environmental statute has 
adopted felony penalties.244 Within this array of new laws, prosecu-
tions have been pursued vigorously245 based on the concept that the 
environment is a crime victim. 
Former Attorney General Richard Thornburg believes the empha-
sis on criminal enforcement in environmental law puts the issue of 
pollution in its proper context. "It says that we believe as a nation 
and as prosecutors that a polluter is a criminal who has violated the 
rights and the sanctity of a living thing-the largest living organism 
in the known universe-the earth's environment."246 
241 Habicht, supra note 238, at 10479; Susan Hedman, Expressive Functians of Criminal 
Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889 (1991) (indicating that more than 
seventy percent of the American public favors the use of jail terms when companies are found 
guilty of deliberately violating pollution laws). 
242 Hedman, supra note 241, at 889-90 (observing that the burst of environmental legislation 
in the 1970s represented an effort to change social norms about the environment). 
243 Robert Abrams, The Maturing Discipline of Enviranmental Prosecution, 16 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 279, 280-81 (1991) (citing N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 71-0921 (McKinney's 1984) 
prohibiting the shooting of a deer out of season). 
244 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1319 (1990) (felony); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401, 7413 (Supp. III 1990) (felony); Toxic Substances Control Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2615 
(1986) (misdemeanor); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, 6928 (1986) 
(felony); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Conservation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601, 9603, 9612 (1980) (felonies); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 
U.S.C. § 1362(b)(1) (1988) (misdemeanor). 
246 See James P. Calve, Enviranmental Crimes: Upping the Ante for Non-Compliance with 
Environmental Laws, 133 MIL. L. REV. 279, 284-90 (1991); Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. et al., 
Criminal Enforcement of State Environmental Laws: The Ohio Solutian, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 217, 219-20 (1990); Mary Ellen Kris & Gail L. Vannelli, Tbday's Criminal Environmental 
Enforcement Program: Why You May Be Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard Against 
Prosecutian Through an Enviranmental Audit, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 229~2 (1991); 
Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Criminal Liability 
for Violations of Enviranmental Statutes in the 1990s, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201, 204-09 
(1991). 
246 R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crime: The Absence of Intent and the Complexities 
of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 313 (1991) (quoting remarks made by Richard 
Thornburg, Attorney General of the United States, before the National Association of District 
Attorneys, Portland, Maine 1-2 on July 19, 1989». 
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This view has been implemented in Justice Department policy 
which has one principal goal: deterrence.247 The Department believes 
that the stigma associated with a criminal conviction and the disloca-
tion of incarceration combine to make the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion a major tool to improve the rate of compliance with the nation's 
environmentallaws.248 The EPA and the Justice Department believe 
that this threat will make it less likely for a member of the regulated 
community to consider willful or calculated evasion of the environ-
mentallaws.249 Toward that end, investigations into alleged environ-
mental crimes are conducted with the intent of identifying, prosecut-
ing, and convicting the highest ranking, truly responsible corporate 
officials.2OO 
b. The Theory 
The threat of criminal punishment is a powerful factor in persuad-
ing people not to impose economic externalities on society at large. 
This view finds strong support in the recent literature on economics 
and law.251 As discussed earlier,252 the costs of pollution may simply be 
viewed as economic externalities or costs that a polluter imposes on 
society at large. The burden then falls upon society to avoid these 
costs by forcing the polluter, through regulation, to internalize its 
costs. In the eyes of economists, criminal sanctions have been justified 
on the premise that they protect certain rights from encroachment 
and the ensuing externalities.253 
247 Habicht, supra note 238, at 10480. 
248 [d. 
249Habicht, supra note 238, at 10480; see Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 245, at 201-02 
(quoting Attorney General Thornburg as saying, "We are finding that nothing so concentrates 
the mind ... upon the environment as our putting their ... pocketbooks and persons in jeopardy 
.. the realization that ... [actions] might actually result in jail time concentrates the mind even 
more."). 
250 Habicht, supra note 238, at 10480; see also The Department of Justice Manual, § 5-11.311 
(1990-91 Supp.) (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(3) (1990) and 1362(5) (1990) and noting the 'Congres-
sional intent that unlawful acts be traced to individual officers and employees and requiring that 
intent to be given serious consideration in the development of prosecutions for environmental 
crimes). 
261 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357 (1973) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, 
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325-26 (R. Hildreth ed., 1864) and indicating that Bentham's deter-
rence theory of criminal punishment is "just a special case of a broader economic theory of legal 
remedies ... to impose costs on people who violate rules"). See also Hedman, supra note 241, 
at 895 (finding support for the development of environmental criminal sanctions in the writings 
of Jeremy Bentham). 
262 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
253 HIRSCH, supra note 79, at 212; see also POSNER, supra note 251, at 205-06 (indicating that 
a criminal is someone who chooses to engage in criminal activity because he believes the 
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The ability of economics to deal with these externalities has grown 
through the years. Early formulations, as espoused by Arthur Pigou, 
reasoned that imposing taxes or other monetary penalties to account 
for the costs borne by society as a result of certain unwanted behavior 
would serve as an appropriate disincentive to crime.254 After Pigou, 
Nobel laureate Gary Becker dealt with the criminal solution to un-
wanted behavior more directly.255 He assumed criminals were eco-
nomically rational and argued that they weigh the costs and prob-
ability of getting caught against the probability and benefits of 
succeeding.256 While Becker believed the chances of getting caught 
weigh more heavily than the potential penalty in a criminal's mind, he 
also believed that there was a trade-off between the penalty and the 
probability of being apprehended.257 Specifically, he believed that 
raising the potential penalty for a violation could allow enforcement 
costs to be reduced because the increased penalty would allow society 
to maintain the optimal level of deterrence while lowering the prob-
ability of detection.258 
Other scholars have tried to use the tools of economics to explain 
criminallaw,259 but these attempts have generally been criticized for 
failing to address important aspects of criminal law.260 Perhaps the 
expected utility of that activity is greater than that of alternate legitimate activities, even after 
accounting for the expected costs of each activity). 
254 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
255 Beth Belton, Does Crime Pay? Ecanomist's Answer Wins, USA TODAY, October 14,1992, 
at 4B. 
256 See id. 
257 See id. 
258 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968), as in A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 76-84 
(19&'3). 
259 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 251, at 207"'{)9 (indicating that criminal fines are a cheap and 
effective remedy as long as the fine exceeds the costs society wants to impose for the violation 
and that incarceration is a useful punishment for violators with no assets because it imposes 
pecuniary costs on the violator by reducing his income while he's confined and by reducing his 
earning capacity after his release). 
260 See, e.g., Guido Calebresi & A. Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1125 (1972) (arguing that 
society imposes criminal penalties to prevent persons from converting property), criticized in 
Coleman, Crime, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
319 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1985), for failing to adequately account for the moral aspects 
of criminal law. See also Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193, 1195-96 (1985) (arguing that criminal penalties exceed damages to encourage people 
to engage in voluntary activities rather than involuntary activities), criticized in Kenneth 
Dau-Schmidt, An Ecanomic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 1,34, for not considering the distributional and other justice criteria considered 
by Calabresi and Malamed. Accord POSNER, supra note 251, at 362-64 (experiencing difficulty 
with the concept of using incarceration as something other than a substitute for monetary 
penalties). 
120 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:89 
greatest flaw in these earlier analyses, though, has been disagreement 
about the question of which externalities should be treated as crimes 
in the first place.261 The penetrating analysis of a recent award win-
ning article262 effectively addresses this question, dealing with the 
usual criticisms and offering a convincing economics-based rationale 
for the criminal law. In that article, Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt 
identifies crime as an externality, specifically, an action through which 
one person realizes his preferences and imposes costs on those with 
incompatible preferences.263 Those costs may take the form of frus-
trating other people's preferences or requiring them to take precau-
tionary measures to avoid the effects of the criminal activity.264 Dau-
Schmidt reviews the traditional solutions to these problems such as 
Pigouvian taxes, damages, and subsidies,265 and rejects them as 
merely creating an incentive to choose one permissible course of 
action over another permissible action. In his words, these are merely 
opportunity shaping policies as opposed to preference shaping policies 
that create an incentive for an individual to choose a particular course 
of action because another possible action is impermissible.266 
Dau-Schmidt's new solution to the problem is that criminal sanc-
tions should be used to shape people's preferences for a particular 
behavior so that an individual's preferences are compatible with soci-
ety's and no externalities are imposed.267 He explains that the threat 
of corporal punishment, in which the person experiences pain, or 
similarly, incarceration, in which the person experiences isolation, is 
a more costly but more effective way to shape preferences than is the 
threat of imposing a financial penalty.268 In the same vein, he observes 
that merely witnessing someone else's reward or punishment for a 
behavior can affect a person's preferences toward a behavior.269 
Dau-Schmidt explains that society must determine what it views 
as the social welfare before it begins to shape people's preferences.27o 
U sing its political process, each society must develop a social welfare 
function by determining which values will be preferred over others.271 
261 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 260 at 27-29. 
262 [d. Professor Dau-Schmidt's article was the 1990 winner of the Association of American 
Law Schools' 1990 Scholarly Paper Competition. [d. 
263 [d. at 8. 
264 [d. 
265 [d. at 10. 
266 [d. at 21. 
267 [d. at 14-15. 
268 [d. at 16. 
269 [d. 
270 [d. at 17. 
271 [d. 
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Once a society knows which values it prefers, it may adopt a prefer-
ence-shaping policy to encourage those values and discourage incom-
patible values.272 Because opportunity-shaping policies such as dam-
ages, taxes, and subsidies273 are less expensive for society to 
administer than preference-shaping policies such as criminal fines, 
probation, and imprisonment,274 preference shaping should be re-
served for dealing with externalities in which the social benefits ex-
pected from criminal punishment exceed the higher social costs. In-
deed, Dau-Schmidt believes preference-shaping policies should be 
reserved for those instances in which there is a significant disparity 
in the utility society derives from the competing incompatible prefer-
ences.275 Society's choice of punishment should then also consider the 
disincentives of existing opportunity-shaping policies.276 
This preference-shaping view of the criminal law is the only eco-
nomically-based theory that explains why criminal law is less con-
cerned with addressing harm to the victim than it is with the intent 
of the accused.277 Similarly, it is the only such theory capable of ex-
plaining why imprisonment, rather than fines,278 is viewed as the 
strongest form of punishment. In sum, Professor Dau-Schmidt be-
lieves the criminal law is a useful tool to persuade people to avoid 
imposing externalities on society. Because of their great costs, how-
ever, Dau-Schmidt believes activities that create those externalities 
should only be labeled as crimes when there is a grave disparity in 
the respective values society assigns to the utility derived from two 
incompatible preferences.279 
272 The social costs consist, among other things, of benefits that would have been achieved if 
certain actors' behavior had not been changed. [d. at 18. 
273 See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
274 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 260, at 23 (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 193 (1968) (indicating that the higher costs flow from 
the higher burden of proof and people's resistance to paying criminal fines because of the 
condemnation attached to them). 
275 [d. 
276 See id. at 24. 
277 This is perhaps most clear in the case of a failed attempt to commit a crime, in which the 
accused may be found guilty absent any harm. [d. at 27 (citing Rex v. Scofield, Caldecott 397 
(K.E. 1784); w. LAFAVE, A. SC01'r, CRIMINAL LAW 495 (2d ed. 1986) and explaining how the 
opportunity-shaping theories developed by Becker and others have difficulty explaining this 
concept). 
278 Under the opportunity-shaping theories, if criminal punishment is the price levied to 
discourage criminal activity, then it should make no difference whether the price is paid in 
dollars or in the pain of imprisonment. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 260, at 31 (citing Becker, supra 
note 258, at 193, and observing that Becker has even argued that society should prefer fines to 
imprisonment because fines are less expensive to administer). 
279 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 260, at 38. In layman's terms, society should only label an activity 
criminal when it chooses to convey its moral outrage. Hedman, supra note 241, at 899. 
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2. Modern Interpretations of Environmental Crime Provisions 
The criminal provisions of modern environmental statutes have 
been read expansively by the courts. This broad interpretation, as 
well as the growing number of environmental statutes providing for 
criminal penalties and the Justice Department's aggressive pursuit of 
the violators, have been widely noticed and analyzed in academic 
literature.2~ Several themes recur in commentators' analyses. These 
include concerns that: the scope of the definition of conduct subject to 
criminal sanctions is expanding;281 the courts are relaxing the stand-
ard of proof needed to prove the accused possessed the requisite mens 
rea,<>282 and inappropriate tools are being used to impose criminalliabil-
ity on persons who would normally be beyond the reach of criminal 
law.283 
Each of these concerns flows from the view that environmental 
statutes are designed to protect the public from risks of which it is 
either unaware or unable to protect itself. This is known as the public 
welfare philosophy and has been the source for a body of law that has 
developed under somewhat similar statutes.284 United States v. Dot-
terweich is the principle case upon which this public welfare philoso-
phy rests.285 In that case, Dotterweich, the president of Buffalo Phar-
maceutical Company, was prosecuted for two misdemeanor violations 
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).286 The presi-
200 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 243, at 279; Calve, supra note 245; Celebrezze, et al., supra 
note 245, at 219; Locke, supra note 246; Christopher Harris, et al., Criminal Liability for 
Violations of Federal Hazardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge" of Corporations and Their 
Executives, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203 (1988); Kris & Vannelli, supra note 245; Marzulla & 
Kappel, supra note 245; Paul G. Nittoly, Environmental Criminal Cases: The Dawn of a New 
Era, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125 (1991); Ruth Ann Weidel, et al., The Erosion of Mens Rea 
in Environmental Criminal Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 1100 (1991); Robert A. 
Milne, Note, The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict Crimi-
nal Liability in Substance But Not Form, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 307 (1989); Susan A. Bernstein, 
Note, Environmental Criminal Law, The Use of Confinement for Criminal Violations of the 
Federal Clean Water Act, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & ClY. CONFINEMENT 107 (1991). 
281 See Celebrezze, et al., supra note 245, at 219-20; Locke, supra note 246, at 311-14; Marzulla 
& Kappel, supra note 245, at 204-09. 
282 See Calve, supra note 245, at 290-96; Locke, supra note 246, at 320-25; Weidel, et al., supra 
note 280, at 1105-13; Milne, supra note 280, at 329-S5. 
283 See Abrams, supra note 243; Harris, et al., supra note 280, at 227-S5; Nittoly, supra note 
280, at 1146-47; Keith A. Ornsdorff, James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer 
Doctrine in RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 22 Envtl. L. 
Rep. 10099 (1992); Weidel, et al., supra note 280, at 1101-05. 
284 See Calve supra note 245, at 290-96 (discussing public welfare offenses and how the concept 
has evolved in environmental crimes). 
285 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
286 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988). 
1993] OIL POLLUTION ACT 123 
dent's corporation had purchased drugs from a manufacturer, re-
packed them, and shipped them interstate under its own label. He was 
convicted of misbranding drugs in interstate commerce and shipping 
an adulterated drug.287 
Dotterweich appealed, arguing that the only "person" subject to 
prosecution under the FFDCA was the corporation.288 The Supreme 
Court reviewed the statute, observing that its purpose was to regu-
late activities that, "touch phases of lives and health of people 'which 
... are largely beyond self-protection .... [And i]n the interest of the 
larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person 
otherwise innocent but standing in a responsible relation to a public 
danger."289 The Court then agreed that the statute identifies the 
corporation as the "person" which may be found guilty of the misde-
meanor of misbranding or adulterating drugs.29o 
To reach corporate officers and managers, the Court relied on the 
historic conception of a misdemeanor under which any person aiding 
or assisting in the commission of a misdemeanor is also guilty of the 
misdemeanor.291 Applying this principal, the Court found that while 
the statute technically implicated only the corporation for the mis-
deed, "[A]ll persons who aid and abet its commission are equally 
guilty."292 Thus, the offense is committed by all who have a responsible 
share in the furtherance of the transaction that the statute outlaws.293 
The Dotterweich case set the stage for United States v. Park,294 in 
which the president of Acme Markets, a food distributor, was charged 
with violating section 301 of the FFDCA. Park was tried and con-
victed for failing to prevent exposure of food in his company's ware-
287 Under the statute, shipments like those at issue in Dotterweich are "punished by the 
statute if the article is misbranded [or adulterated] ... [even if that is done] without any 
conscious fraud at all." 320 U.S. at 281. 
288 See id. at 279. 
289 I d. at 280--81. 
29°ld. at 281. 
291Id. (citing United States v. Mills, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 138, 141 (1833) (holding that one who 
assists a mail carrier in destroying mail is guilty of the misdemeanor as a principle)); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 550 (1909) (amended 1948) (indicating that doctrine had been given general application in the 
penal code). Mills further cites United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827). 
Gooding was convicted of the misdemeanor of trading slaves, although the evidence showed he 
merely encouraged and assisted a ship captain to do so. In upholding Gooding's conviction, the 
Court reasoned that "[i]n cases of misdemeanors, all those who are concerned in aiding and 
abetting, as well as in perpetrating the act, are principles." Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 475. 
292 320 U.S. at 284 (reasoning further that whether an accused shares responsibility in the 
business process resulting in unlawful distribution depends on the evidence produced at the 
trial). The Court deferred to the jury's evaluation of the evidence. ld. at 285. 
293 I d. at 284. 
294421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
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house to rodent contamination.295 The evidence at trial showed the 
Federal Food and Drug Administration had sent letters to Park warn-
ing him of the problem and indicating that it viewed Park as the 
individual responsible to correct the situation. Park trusted subordi-
nates to take appropriate actions, but they did not.296 
Park appealed his conviction. The question presented to the Su-
preme Court on appeal was whether the government must show a 
defendant's "wrongful action" before he may be convicted on a "re-
sponsible relationship" theory under Dotterweich.2!Tl The Court de-
cided that the government does not have to show a wrongful action, 
but that under Dotterweich, "responsible share" does imply some 
measure of blameworthiness.298 The Court reasoned that, "[T]he pub-
lic interest in the purity of its food is so great as to warrant the 
imposition of the highest standard of care on distributors."299 It re-
quires food distributors to be the strictest censors of their merchan-
dise.3OO The FFDCA punishes "neglect where the law requires care, 
or inaction where it imposes a duty."301 In short, the Court held that 
the Act permits conviction of those responsible corporate officials 
who, in light of this standard of care, have the power to prevent or 
correct violations of its provisions.302 
Dotterweich and Park have been the grist for thought provoking 
commentary on the nature of the criminal justice system.3oo More 
importantly, the Supreme Court's view that the special purpose of the 
2$ [d. 
2$ [d. at 663-65. 
2!17 [d. at 673. 
2~[d. 
299 [d. at 671 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959». 
300 [d. 
301 [d. (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952». 
300 [d. at 676. Cf 421 U.S. at 678 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (interpreting the Court's holding as 
requiring the prosecution to "at least show that by reason of an individual's corporate position 
and responsibilities, he had a duty to use care to maintain the physical integrity of the corpo-
ration's food products"). 
300 See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of Carparate Officers for Strict Liability 
Offenses-A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463 (1981) (arguing that 
the two cases are sufficiently imprecise to allow some culpability to be shown before a corporate 
official may be convicted for the strict liability crimes of the corporation, and that such a reading 
is proper even when the statute's purpose is to maintain an adequate condition of cleanliness 
and health in society). Cf Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corparate Officers far 
Strict Liability Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337 (1982) (arguing that the two 
cases are properly interpreted as requiring strict liability for a corporate official who holds a 
position that carries responsibility and authority to prevent and correct such violations and as 
requiring proof that he failed to properly exercise that authority, when his act or omission causes 
a violation of a substantive statute designed to protect the public health or welfare). 
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act304 justified the conviction of responsible 
corporate officers, has been the basis for attempts to extend the 
responsible corporate officer principle to environmental crimes.305 
Specifically, prosecutors have used the Dotterweich and Park deci-
sions as the basis for arguments to minimize the scienter requirement 
needed to prove violations of an environmental crime.306 
Such attempts to extend the FFDCA cases to environmental 
crimes have been made in a number of courts based upon a number 
of statutes.307 To date, though, courts have been reluctant to reduce 
the scienter requirements mandated by Congress308 or to impose li-
ability upon more individuals than those whose acts and mental state 
satisfy the requirements of the law.309 
304 See supra notes 291-93, 299-300 and accompanying text. 
305 See Calve, supra note 245, at 292-93 (indicating that environmental crimes have at their 
foundation the same essential purpose as public welfare offenses and noting that to avoid due 
process problems, when the crime is a felony rather than a misdemeanor, knowledge is required; 
this latter class of cases is known as "public welfare hybrids"); Kris & Vannelli, supra note 245, 
at 239 (citing recent case examples); Ornsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 283, at 10102 (observing 
that doctrine applied to RCRA); Milne, supra note 280, at 323-24 (observing that the Refuse 
Act is a public welfare statute that imposes strict criminal liability on violators and noting 
attempts to apply the doctrine to environmental statutes containing scienter requirements). 
306 See Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge Requirement of 
Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 862, 872 (1991) 
(written by the prosecuting attorneys in the Dee case); Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 245, at 
212 (citing United States v. Johnson Towers, 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984) cert. denied sub nom 
Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) and United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 
1499 (11th Cir. 1986) as examples of courts eviscerating the scienter requirement); Locke, supra 
note 246, at 321, 324-25 (citing United States v. Hofiin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cm. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d at 1499; United States v. 
Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 662 as examples of relaxed standards of proof); Harris, et 
al., supra note 280, at 224-27 (citing Johnson & Towers as an example); Weidel, et aI., supra 
note 276, at 1104 (citing United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123, but acknowledging the 
contrary precedent of United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991»; Milne, supra 
note 280, at 330-35 (citing Johnson & Towers). 
307 See United States v. Hofiin, 880 F.2d at 1034-40; United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 
F.2d at 1500-{)7; United States v. Johnson & 'Ibwers, 741 F.2d at 663-70; United States v. Frezzo 
Bros., 602 F.2d at 1124-30; United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. at 877-85. 
308 See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 53--55 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(requiring proof of corporate officers' knowledge and distinguishing Johnson & Towers because 
there the court simply allowed an inference of knowledge of the law but required the govern-
ment to prove knowledge of acts relative to violations charged); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 
741, 745 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a knowing violation of RCRA may occur even if the 
defendant was ignorant of the law if he knew the wastes he was handling were hazardous); 
United States v. Hofiin, 880 F.2d at 1036-39 (holding that the government need not prove 
knowledge of the law); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d at 1501 (knowledge may be 
inferred when evidence supports the inference); United States v. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 
at 669 (requiring the government to prove "knowingly" as to all elements of an offense and 
allowing the jury the unexceptional ability to infer knowledge of the law). 
309 See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d at 50-55; United States 
v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035 (defendant directed employees to dispose of paint improperly); United 
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Nevertheless, with the increasing number of environmental crimes 
enacted by Congress,310 the heightened efforts of DOJ and the EPA 
in pursuing convictions,311 and the express inclusion of a responsible 
corporate officer provision within the Clean Water Act,312 the law in 
this area will likely see future developments. 
C. The Extraterritoriality of United States Criminal Law 
The use of criminal penalties to protect the environment not only 
changes behavior domestically, but should also change behavior be-
yond the United States, leading to a reversal of the trend in which 
courts only hesitatingly give extraterritorial effect to environmental 
statutes.313 The criminal provisions in environmental statutes have 
been interpreted broadly,314 and recent judicial interpretations of in-
ternationallaw principles may allow these broad interpretations to 
reach beyond United States borders and have a broader international 
effect.315 While these interpretations remain controversial,316 the re-
cent high profile prosecution of General Manuel Antonio Noriega 
States v. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670 (finding that the statute applies to "any person" 
and inferring in dicta that knowledge of a responsible officer could be inferred); United States 
v. White, 766 F. Supp. at 894-95 (holding that a corporate official may not be held criminally 
liable solely for the environmental violations of his employees and identifying contrary language 
in Johnson & 1bwers as "clearly dicta"). 
310 See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text. 
311 See supra notes 245--50 and accompanying text. 
312 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(6) (1988). 
313 See Turley, supra note 90, and accompanying text. 
314 See supra notes 280--84 and accompanying text. 
315 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193-97 (1992) (permitting the 
abduction of a Mexican national from his home to stand trial in the United States for the murder 
of a DEA agent); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1061-66 (1991) (relaxing 
the Fourth Amendment protections available to nonresident aliens outside the territorial limits 
of the United States); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900-01 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding 
the court had authority to assert jurisdiction over a Lebanese terrorist who seized an American 
during the hijacking of a Jordanian aircraft in the Middle East and who, after being lured out 
of his country, was transported to the United States by the U.S. Navy). See also Jose v. Fir 
Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 356-57 (D. Ore. 1991) (following Noriega's extraterritorial application 
of RICO). 
316 For a discussion of the relative merits of the recent developments, see generally Abraham 
Abramovsky, Extraterritarial Abduction: Americas "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 
VA. J. INT'L L. 151 (1991); Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: 
A Gross Vwlation, 29 COLUM. J. 'l'RANSNATL L. 293 (1991) (arguing that the United States will 
have to recommit itself to cooperation instead of unilateralism); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legal-
ity of the United States Action in Panama, 29 COLUM. J. 'l'RANSNATL L. 281 (1991) (supporting 
the action's lawfulness); Ruth Wedgwood, The Use of Armed Forces in International Affairs: 
Self Defense and the Panama Invasion, 29 COLUM J. 'l'RANSNAT'L. L. 609 (1991) (arguing that 
the United States must abide by international law). 
1993] OIL POLLUTION ACT 127 
provides a well reasoned example of a federal trial court implement-
ing the developing law.3!7 
Prosecutors alleged that General Noriega used his position as Com-
mander in Chief of the Panamanian Defense Forces to protect cocaine 
shipments from Colombia, through Panama, to the United States.318 
Noriega was charged with conspiring to distribute and import cocaine 
into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963;319 distributing, 
and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine with the intent that 
it be imported into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 959 
and 18 U.S.C. § 2;320 conspiring to manufacture cocaine, with the intent 
to import it into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963;321 
causing interstate travel and use of facilities in interstate commerce 
to promote an unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) 
and 18 U.S.C. § 2322; and engaging in a racketeering activity in viola-
tion of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) 
statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d).323 
These charges were brought while General Noriega was the de 
facto leader of Panama.324 Shortly after the charges were brought, 
Noriega declared a state of war between Panama and the United 
States.325 Five days later, President Bush ordered American troops 
into combat in Panama with several goals. One of those goals was to 
take Noriega into custody to stand trial for the charges pending 
against him.326 Noriega eventually surrendered himself to U.S. 
officials and was flown to Florida where he was formally arrested by 
U.S. drug enforcement agents.327 
In the course of resolving several complex questions flowing from 
the unusual circumstances of this case, the Noriega court was asked 
to determine whether it could properly exercise jurisdiction over 
actions taken by the general in Panama.328 The court addressed the 
question by first breaking it into two subissues. First, may the United 
States reach the conduct under traditional principles of international 
317 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
318 [d. at 1510. 
319 [d. 
320 [d. 
321 [d. 
322 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp.1506, 1510 (1991). 
323 [d. 
324 [d. at 1511. 
325 [d. 
326 [d. 
327 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (1991). 
328 [d. at 1512. 
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law? Second, do the statutes under which the defendant was charged 
applyextraterritorially?329 
In response to the first question, the court quoted Justice Holmes 
for the proposition that "acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended 
to produce or producing effects within it, justify a State in punishing 
the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the 
State should succeed in getting him within its power."330 The court 
also observed that one of the factors to be considered in assessing the 
reasonableness of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the character of the 
activity to be regulated. This includes the importance the regulating 
state places on regulating that activity and the degree to which the 
desire to regulate is generally accepted.33l The court resolved this 
factor in favor of maintaining jurisdiction because the United States 
has the requisite interest in controlling its drug epidemic, it issues its 
regulations pursuant to an international convention,332 and Panama 
has not objected to the United States' regulation of drug trafficking.333 
Having determined that the direct effect of Noriega's conduct 
within the United States made extraterritorial jurisdiction appropri-
ate as a matter of international law, the court turned to the question 
of whether the statutes under which Noriega was charged were in-
tended to apply to conduct outside the United States.334 The court 
noted that 21 U .S.C. § 959's prohibition on the distribution of narcotics 
with the intent of importing them into the United States specifically 
329 Id. These two questions must be answered to determine whether Congress granted the 
court both prescriptive and subject matter jurisdiction. Turley, supra note 90, at 636. 
3ll! 746 F. Supp. at 1513 (quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), (citing Church 
v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804» for the proposition that, "[a nation's] power to 
secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.") It is 
worth noting that getting such a person within the United States' power may not be as 
problematic in the 1990s as Justice Holmes envisioned. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 
110 S. Ct. 1056, 1060~6 (1990) (apparently abolishing the application of the Fourth Amendment 
to federal law enforcement activities directed against non-citizens on foreign soil). But see Mark 
H. Alcott, et al., New York State Bar Association International Litigation Committee, Commer-
cial and Federal Litigation Section, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Non-Resident Aliens, 27 
STAN. J. INTL L. 493 (1991); Richard Downing, Recent Development, The Domestic and 
International Legal Implications of the Abduction of Criminals From Fareign Soil, 26 STAN. 
J. INT'L L. 573 (1990); Mindy A. Oppenheim, Comment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: 
Hands Across the Border-The Long Reach of United States Agents Abroad and the Short 
Reach of the Fourth Amendment, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 617 (1991), for the storm of criticism 
this decision raised. 
331 746 F. Supp. at 1515 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES, § 403(1)(c)(X». 
332 746 F. Supp. at 1515 (citing the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 18 U.S.T. 1409, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, New York, March 30,1961, ratified by the United States, 1967, amended 26 
U.S.T. 1441, T.I.A.S. No. 8118). 
333 746 F. Supp. at 1515. 
334 Id. 
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states that it "is intended to reach acts of manufacture or distribution 
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States"335 
and thus found that this statute does apply extraterritorially. None 
of the other statutes under which Noriega was charged state an 
express intention to assume extraterritorial effect.336 
When a statute's language is silent as to its extraterritorial reach, 
the court observed, a presumption against such application generally 
applies.337 The presumption will be rebutted, though, if the nature of 
the law permits extraterritorial reach and Congress intends the 
same.338 The Noriega court then used this analysis to determine with 
little discussion that 21 U.S.C. § 952's prohibition on the importation 
of "narcotics into the United States from any place outside thereof' 
applies to conduct that begins abroad.339 Any contrary interpretation, 
the court reasoned, would render the statute meaningless.340 The 
court then used the same reasoning to retain jurisdiction over the 
conspiracy to import and the aiding and abetting charges.341 
The more challenging issues for the court involved determinations 
of whether the RICO statutes, or the statutes prohibiting the use of 
interstate travel or facilities used in interstate travel to promote an 
unlawful activity,342 should be given extraterritorial effect. The court 
observed that section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for "any person 
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which 
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate ... 
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity."343 Similarly, section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for 
"any person to conspire to violate" section 1962(c).344 The court viewed 
this language as being all inclusive, not suggesting parochial applica-
tion,345 and observed that while Congress' purpose and findings speak 
335 [d. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 959(c) (1988». 
336 746 F. Supp. at 1515. 
337 [d. (citing United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 1984) cen. denied 471 
U.S. 1137 (1985». 
338 746 F. Supp. at 1515 (quoting United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980» 
(observing further that the exercise of that power may be inferred from the nature of the 
offenses and Congress' other legislative efforts to eliminate the type of crime involved). Cj. 
Turley, supra note 90, at 630--31 (indicating that in cases not involving market regulation, such 
as this, Congress must clearly express its intent that a law apply extraterritorially). 
339 746 F. Supp. at 1516. 
340 [d. 
341 [d. 
342 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
343 746 F. Supp. at 1516. 
344 [d. 
345 746 F. Supp. at 1516. 
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only of criminal activity in the United States, RICO should be given 
extraterritorial effect.346 In doing so, the court reasoned: 
Keeping in mind Congress' specific instructions that RICO be 
applied liberally to effect its remedial purpose the Court cannot 
suppose that RICO does not reach such unlawful conduct simply 
because it is extraterritorial in nature. As long as the racketeer-
ing activities produce effects or are intended to produce effects in 
this country, RICO applies.347 
The Noriega court similarly found that the Travel Act applied 
extraterritorially. The court reasoned that "by creating a federal in-
terest in limiting the interstate movement needed to conduct certain 
activities, criminal conduct beyond the reach of local officials could be 
controlled."348 Reading the Act broadly, the court believed it "consti-
tutes an effect to deny individuals who act for criminal purposes 
access to the channels of commerce."349 Even though Noriega's loca-
tion was different than the typical defendant under the Travel Act, 
the court reasoned that "the nature and effect of the alleged activity 
is the same, and implicates the same congressional desire to reach 
conduct which transcends state lines."35o Finding no statutory lan-
guage that "suggests a restriction based upon the locus of conduct 
other than that it result in activity crossing state lines,"351 the court 
reasoned that ''where, as here, the defendant causes interstate travel or 
activity to promote an unlawful purpose, § 1952(a)(3) applies, whether 
or not the defendant is physically present in the United States.''352 
After determining that U.S. criminal law proscribed Noriega's con-
duct in Panama, the court denied his due process claims based on 
alleged U.S. violations of international law. Noriega asserted that the 
U.S. invasion of Panama violated the due process clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, as well as internationallaw.353 The court cited the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine and ruled in accordance with it that a court is not 
deprived of jurisdiction to try a defendant just because the defen-
dant's presence before the court was procured by unlawful means.354 
346 [d. at 1517 (citing RICO Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 
922 (1970) 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073). 
347 [d. 
348 [d. at 1518 (quoting United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 280, 290 (1969)). 
349 [d. (quoting Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 246 (1972)). 
350 [d. 
351 [d. at n.9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
352 [d. at 1519. 
353 [d. at 1529. 
354 [d. (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1880) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 549 (1952), and 
quoting United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir.) em. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1975)). 
Here the court followed United States v. Winter, in which the Fifth Circuit declared: 
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Noriega also argued that the invasion violated international trea-
ties and customary internationallaw.355 The court again relied on the 
Ker-Frisbie doctrine for the proposition that violations of interna-
tional law do not deprive a court of jurisdiction over a defendant in 
the absence of specific treaty language to that effect.356 The court 
viewed President Bush's decision to invade Panama as a political 
question involving foreign policy with which it would not interfere.357 
It also ruled that because treaties are designed to protect the sover-
eign interests of nations,358 Noriega had no standing to challenge a 
violation of international law in the absence of a protest by the sov-
ereign involved.359 
When this case is viewed as representing a trend in U.S. criminal 
law that extends the law's reach beyond U.S. borders, the growth in 
the number of environmental statutes providing for criminal penalties 
becomes significant. The potential for expanding criminal liability to 
shape the preferences of those persons whose environmental mis-
deeds occur beyond U.S. borders but affect the United States is 
nearly palpable. The analysis that follows argues that the Oil Pollution 
Act's crimes are an appropriate first step in extending the reach of 
U.S. environmental law beyond its traditional reach. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Existing International Conventions Do Not Reflect the 
Economic and Environmental Realities of 
Marine Transportation Today 
Since 1633 the seas have been generally governed by the theories 
of Hugo Grotius, who advocated freedom on those seas.360 When the 
United States saw an advantage in encouraging those freedoms, it 
We are convinced that under well-established case law of the Supreme Court and this 
Circuit, a defendant in a criminal trial whether citizen or alien, whether arrested within 
or beyond the territory of the United States, may not successfully challenge the 
District Court's jurisdiction over his person on the grounds that his presence was 
unlawfully secured. 
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 985--86 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1975). 
355Id. at 1532. 
356Id. at 1533 (citing United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 444 U.S. 862 
(1979)). 
357Id. at 1538 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) and Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962)). 
358Id. at 1533 (citing United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
359Id. (citing United States v. Hersel, 699 F.2d 18,30 (1st Cir.) cert. denied 461 U.S. 958 (1983)). 
360 See supra notes 42-65 and accompanying text. 
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made every effort to shape international law to its advantage.361 En-
vironmental concerns on the ocean have thus far bowed to the theo-
ries of Grotius362 as implemented in MARPOL and UNCLOS, apply-
ing their complicated systems of flag state enforcement. It is only 
recently that a combination of several previously unrelated develop-
ments in law,363 legal theorY,364 and policy365 may coalesce to allow a 
reexamination of questions regarding the interplay between environ-
mental protection and the freedom of the seas. 
When marine pollution first became a concern, it was addressed in 
international conventions. These developed complicated systems of 
enforcement that allowed undefined actions to be taken by states 
other than flag states under limited circumstances.366 In general, 
though, these conventions deferred issues of jurisdiction to the devel-
oping law of the sea.367 When read in tandem with the 1954 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, MARPOL served merely to strengthen flag 
state controp68 When the 1982 U.N. Convention was completed, it 
addressed pollution concerns in somewhat greater detail but retained 
a structure that defers to a vessel's flag state for compliance certifica-
tion and enforcement actions.369 This legal framework reinforces the 
"tragedy of the commons" situation, leading all actors to take what-
ever measures best serve their interests until, finally, the resource is 
exhausted.370 
Under this legal regime, any flag state that enforces environmental 
standards strictly, in effect, would limit the portion of the commons 
its flag vessels could use. Doing so would force those vessels to "in-
ternalize their externalities."371 If every nation took similar measures, 
there could be progress in controlling pollution. Unfortunately, this 
type of stringent enforcement measure also leads to a "prisoner's 
dilemma" in which other nations have the opportunity to realize a 
competitive advantage by enjoying the benefits of another country's 
environmental protection activities while taking limited action at 
home.372 
361 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. 
362 See supra notes 42~5, 161-165 and accompanying text. 
363 See generally supra lILA, B, and C. 
364 See supra IlI.B. 
365 See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text. 
366 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
367 [d. 
368 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
369 See supra notes 146--48 and accompanying text. 
370 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
371 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
372 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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This situation has led developing countries to offer "flags of conven-
ience." Vessels under their control are generally subject to less strin-
gent environmental regulation,373 so there is a common shift in vessel 
registry from nations like the United States, with strict environ-
mental regulations, to flag states of convenience.374 Under the current 
legal regime, as vessels change their flag of registry from the United 
States to a flag state of convenience, the percentage of vessels subject 
to stringent environmental control obviously shrinks.375 
The solution to the tragedy of the commons problem lies in some 
mandate from a superior authority or in an agreement among the 
parties, with sanctions to compel conformance.376 Under international 
law, however, there are few mandates from superior authorities. 
Along with treaties of general principles, nations are governed by 
customary international law, which is created by consistent and uni-
form state practice and followed out of a sense of legal obligation.377 
While many provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
have been accepted as declarative of customary internationallaw,378 
the Convention has not been signed by the United States.379 Moreover, 
the concept of customary international law leaves some room for 
change or modification in response to changing circumstances.380 
B. The Oil Pollution Act Takes a Bold Step Forward in 
Addressing Today's Marine Pollution Problems 
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea was negotiated during 
the mid 1970s and completed in 1982.381 During those negotiations, 
environmental law in the United States was in a nascent stage.382 
373 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. See also Wang, supra note 71, at 332 (indicating 
that vessels registered in flag of convenience states have the worst records of polluting the 
oceans). 
374 See Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, at 277 n.28. Under the current legal regime, 
when a nation such as the United States, with strict environmental regulation loses vessels 
flying its flag, it loses the concomitant control over vessel source pollution and the world loses 
the environmental benefits of stringent control. [d. 
375 Cf Gold, supra note 26, at 438 (indicating that one result of United States' adopting strict 
requirements in Oil Pollution Act is that "a number of responsible operators will continue to 
serve the U.S. market subject to available insurance coverage, and that importing oil companies 
will become more and more selective in their choice of carriers.") 
376 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
377 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. 
378 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
379 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
380 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
381 See Oxman, supra note 63, at 809. 
382 See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text. See also Habicht, supra note 238, at 
10478-79. 
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While the Convention recognizes a coastal state's ability to protect 
itself from marine pollution, it limits the state's ability to impose 
penalties on an offender. Only monetary penalties may be assessed 
for pollution in the territorial sea unless the pollution is proven to be 
the result of a willful and serious act.383 
Since the Convention was negotiated, environmental law has ma-
tured. The costs pollution imposes on society have been widely rec-
ognized,384 and Congress has passed a great deal of domestic legisla-
tion regarding pollution. As Congress has been asked to deal with 
progressively more difficult problems, it has turned increasingly to 
criminal enforcement methods.385 In doing so, it has apparently recog-
nized the need to shape the preferences of those who would choose to 
pollute even if doing so would expose them to liability for a monetary 
penalty.386 Some have called this response to environmental challenges 
the New Environmental Paradigm.387 
Since Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, it has been a 
crime for any person to negligentlYS88 or knowingly389 spill oil or haz-
ardous materials390 in the internal waters,391 territorial sea,392 contigu-
ous zone,393 or exclusive economic zone394 of the United States. The law 
311l See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
384 See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. 
386 See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
387 See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. 
388 See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
389 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
390 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
391 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988) (defining 
navigable waters to include the waters of the United States, including the territorial sea). 
3!l2Id. 
393 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
394 Id. But see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1988) (excepting discharges as permitted by the Protocol 
of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships). 
MARPOL does not use permits as an enforcement tool so the meaning of what is permitted 
under the Act could be viewed as ambiguous. The only instance in which the use of this word 
could aid in the understanding of the statutory language is in the legislative history of the Act 
that added this language to 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1988). See the Act to Prevent Pollution from 
Ships, Pub. L. No. 96-478, 94 Stat. 427. The legislative history of that Act refers to the prior 
practice of oil tankers under existing law in these words: "[b]eyond 50 miles [from land] tanker 
operational discharges are permitted while proceeding enroute, if the instantaneous rate of 
discharge does not exceed 60 liters per mile and the total quantity of oil discharged on a ballast 
voyage does not exceed one part per 15,000 of the total cargo capacity." (emphasis added). H.R. 
No. 96-1224, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. § 3 (1980). The House Report then continues with an expla-
nation of tanker operations and ballasting, the inevitability of mixing oil with water, and how 
MARPOL tries to reduce concomitant discharges of oil. Id. at §§ 5-.Q. MARPOL, in fact, places 
stringent technical requirements on the operation of tankers. See supra note 103 and accompa-
nying text. The only reading of § 1321(b)(3)(ii)(A) that executes the congressional policy that 
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provides for criminal fines395 and lengthy prison terms.396 This is a clear 
change from the domestic legal regime that prevailed in the Exxon 
Valdez prosecution.3!17 
When it is enforced, the Oil Pollution Act will be used to exercise 
U.S. criminal jurisdiction beyond the geographical jurisdiction ac-
corded to a coastal state under the U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.398 It will also bring within U.S. criminal jurisdiction a class of 
persons who have until now been beyond the reach of that jurisdic-
tion. The class of persons that will be subject to liability includes 
responsible corporate officers.399 With this addition will come the Jus-
tice Department's effort to attribute criminal responsibility to the 
highest ranking responsible officer.4°O 
Because the Oil Pollution Act's amendments incorporated the Clean 
Water Act's specific reference to responsible corporate officer liabil-
ity,401 a major hurdle toward establishing their liability has been re-
moved; there will be no need to prove the Act is a public welfare 
statute.402 Moreover, the real debate over the responsible corporate 
officer doctrine involves the question of whether it imposes criminal 
liability on corporate officers who lack the necessary mens rea when 
the underlying statute requires knowledge.403 Under the Oil Pollution 
there should be "no discharge of oil ... which may affect natural resources ... of the United 
States," 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1), is one that would read the statutory words to permit discharge 
in accordance with the technical requirements of the regulations implemented by MARPOL. 
There is also an exception to the general rules that makes them inapplicable if a discharge of 
oil or oily mixture results from damage to a ship or its equipment. See supra note 103, regulation 
11(b). Here again, this passage must be read with caution. Arguably, all accidental oil spills are 
preceded by some damage to a ship. Thus, read the wrong way, this clause could conceivably 
eliminate all liability for any oil spill that occurs after an accident. That reading, though, would 
frustrate MARPOI1s goal of minimizing accidental discharge of oil into the ocean. See supra 
note 102 and accompanying text. The only logical reading of this regulation is that it applies to 
vessels that spill oil during routine operations as a result of damage to their equipment. This 
reading is bolstered by two conditions on the applicability of the exception. First, the exception 
only applies if "all reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence of the damage 
or discovery of the discharge for the purpose of preventing or minimizing the damage" and as 
long as the owner or master has not acted "either with intent to cause damage, or recklessly 
with knowledge that damage would probably result." Supra note 103, regulation 1l(b). 
396 See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text. 
396 [d. 
397 See supra notes 163-204 and accompanying text. 
398 See supra notes 158--62 and accompanying text. 
399 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
400 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
401 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6). 
402 See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text; United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 
(10th Cir. 1991). 
403 See supra notes 303-10 and accompanying text. 
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Act, there are serious penalties associated with negligent violations.404 
While courts have so far been unwilling to experiment with this 
doctrine, the Oil Pollution Act's negligence standard may provide 
fertile ground for expanding the Dotterweich and Park reasoning be-
yond the narrow framework of strict liability public welfare misde-
meanors.405 
C. United States Courts Should Enforce the Oil Pollution Act~ 
Criminal Penalties Extraterritorially and 
Against Foreign Nationals 
Just as important as the breadth and stringency of the Oil Pollution 
Act's liability provisions is the question of whether its criminal provi-
sions may apply to foreign nationals beyond U.S. territory.406 As the 
Noriega case illustrates407 a trend appears to be developing that is 
lowering the barriers to prosecution of foreign nationals whose ac-
tions outside the United States have some arguable effect inside. 
Just as in the Noriega court's interpretation of the RICO statutes 
and Travel Act,408 the Oil Pollution Act's penalties apply to "any per-
son who negligently ... or knowingly violates ... 1321(b)(3)."409 While 
this choice of wording alone may not be enough to overcome any 
remaining presumption against extraterritorial application,4lO other 
factors argue in favor of such an application. First, the statute on its 
face applies beyond U.S. territory.411 Second, its text is not limited to 
Americans, people on U.S. flag vessels, or people on vessels calling at 
U.S. ports.412 Third, Congress clearly intended that the Oil Pollution 
Act push the progress of international law in the area of monetary 
compensation.413 Fourth, there is no legislative history indicating the 
404 See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
406 See supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text; United States v. MacDonald & Watson 
Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 54 (1st Cir. 1991) (refusing to extend the responsible corporate officer 
doctrine to a statute requiring knowledge but noting in dicta its potential for use in cases not 
involving a knowledge requirement) (citing United States v. Frezzo Bros. Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 
(3d Cir. 1979) een. denied 444 U.S. 1074 (1980». 
406 Clearly, the Oil Pollution Act, like all laws, applies to U.S. citizens wherever they may be. 
See, e.g., Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1512 n.4. 
4117 Along with Alvarez-Maehain, Verdugo-Urquidez and Yunis. See supra note 315 and ac-
companying text. 
406 See supra notes 342-52 and accompanying text. 
400 See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text. 
410 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
4ll See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
412 [d. 
413 Oil Pollution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 3001,104 Stat. 507-08 (1990); H.R.CoNF. REP. No. 
653, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 125-26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 803~4. See also George 
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adoption of a narrow interpretation of the Act's criminal provision.414 
Fifth, even if there were a contrary legislative intent, the Supreme 
Court's current standards for statutory interpretation would not al-
Iowa court to rely on that contrary history.415 Sixth, and perhaps most 
significantly, the actions that could lead a foreign national to be in-
dicted for violating the Oil Pollution Act's criminal standards would 
be actions that, when they occur beyond the territorial sea, must have 
an effect on the resources of the United States.416 
When considered individually, no one of these factors may be con-
clusive. Considered together, the factors are at least as persuasive as 
the Noriega court's reasoning allowing the General's prosecution un-
der RICO and the Travel Act.417 If there is any remaining presumption 
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law after Al-
varez-Machain, Yunis, and Noriega, these factors should be sufficient 
to rebut it. 
Interpreting the Oil Pollution Act to apply extraterritorially would 
also expose corporate officers responsible for environmental affairs to 
criminal liability in the United States. This would be true regardless 
of whether the vessel for which the officer is responsible flies the 
United States flag or a flag of convenience, or whether the officer is 
physically located in the United States or overseas. 
Recent trends and the historical analysis of the law of the sea 
provide a persuasive answer to the second question framed by the 
Noriega court-whether the United States may reach the conduct 
under traditional principles of international law. In this regard, the 
J. Mitchell, Preservatioo of State and Federal Authority Under the Oil Pollutioo Act of 1990, 
21 ENVTL. L. 237 (1991). 
414 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779; 
S. REP. No. 99, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U .S.C.C.A.N. 750, 770 (describing 
the purpose of the legislation and indicating that Congress intended to allow prosecutions under 
the Hamel and Exxon approach); S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723 (indicating that the bill tries to consolidate and enhance the oil spill 
liability and compensation provisions of at least five different statutes, each of which is viewed 
as different and inadequate); H.R. REP. No. 200, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (discussing 
increased and criminal penalties under other Acts, in particular, the Ports and Waterways 
Safety Act, the Intervention on the High Seas Act, the Deepwater Ports Act, and the Act to 
Prevent Pollution from Ships). 
416 See United States v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (failing to consult legislative history in spite of disputed 
statutory meaning); Public Citizens v. Dep't. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (challenging legislative materials as unauthoritative). See also George A. Costello, 
Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictioos": The Relative Reliability of Committee 
Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39 (1990). 
416 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
417 See supra notes 342-52 and accompanying text. 
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Noriega court quoted Mr. Justice Holmes for the proposition that, 
"acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce or producing 
effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as 
if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in 
getting him within its power."418 The court then observed that "[a 
nation's] power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised 
beyond the limits of its territory."419 
Thus, in determining the reasonableness of exercising extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, the Noriega court relied on the nature of the conduct 
and the degree to which the desire to regulate is generally accepted. 
The court observed the Vnited States' strong interest in controlling 
its drug epidemic, its participation in an international Convention, and 
the fact that Panama had not objected to V.S. regulation of drug 
trafficking.420 In light of these strong interests, the court determined 
that international law did not preclude the General's prosecution.421 
V nder the Oil Pollution Act, there is a similarly strong interest in 
regulating against maritime oil SpillS.422 Although there is an interna-
tional Convention whose provisions would weigh against this jurisdic-
tion,423 it has never been ratified by the requisite number of states 
including the V nited States.424 Furthermore, there remains the ques-
tion of whether the convention reflects customary internationallaw.425 
Indeed, there is persuasive evidence for the proposition that the 
Convention's limits on coastal state powers have not attained the 
status of customary international law.426 Moreover, the Convention 
was developed before the nations of the world recognized the strong 
measures that must be taken to control environmental harm.427 In-
stead, the Convention took its current form because the V nited States 
had a pressing interest in ensuring the free navigation of its warships 
when the Convention was being negotiated.428 
Although the concepts generally thought to underlie the convention 
have been accepted for over 350 years, they were originally nothing 
more than an advocate's response to a world situation that was op-
418 See 746 F. Supp. at 1513. 
419 [d. (citing Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 234). 
400 See supra notes 328-33 and accompanying text. 
421 [d. 
422 See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text. 
423 See generally, supra notes 1214i2 and accompanying text. 
424 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
425 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
425 [d. 
427 See Hahn & Richards, supra note 85; Hedman, supra note 241, and accompanying text. 
428 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. 
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pressive to his client.429 More importantly, while the Convention, 
MARPOL, and the commentators430 all seem to have adopted the view 
that the seas must be governed by a seemingly absolute concept they 
call the "freedom of the seas,"43l that absolutism is neither the end for 
which Grotius argued, nor is it supported by his reasoning.432 
Any court asked to resolve this question should review the words 
of Grotius and let history confine the concept of the freedom of the 
seas.433 Grotius recognized that a certain type of ownership is neces-
sary for those things which, when used, become less fit for future 
use.434 He specifically limited the category of property subject to 
common use to those things which can be used without loss to anyone 
else,435 and he based his conclusion that the seas must be open to free 
navigation on his understanding that "navigation cannot harm anyone 
except the navigator himself."436 
It is now clear that Grotius' belief that navigation does not harm 
anyone but the navigator does not apply to modern shipping meth-
ods.437 Indeed, a recent study indicates that the risk of serious oil spills 
greatly exceeds the risk society accepts in other aspects of modern 
life.438 The entire MARPOL Convention and the United States legis-
lation that implements it are premised on the need to control and 
reduce pollution from routine operations of vessel traffic.439 Moreover, 
scientists now have evidence that environmental systems do not de-
teriorate gradually but may maintain their basic integrity until the 
point of collapse,440 " ... at which point the process of decay could no 
longer be feasibly arrested."441 
Put plainly and simply, pollution of the ocean from the routine 
operation of vessels has become "a liability to be borne by the inter-
national community as a whole."442 Because "the ocean is the most 
429 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
430 See e.g., supra note 73. 
431 [d. 
432 See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
433 See CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 51. 
434 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
435 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
436 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
437 See supra notes 28-131 and accompanying text. 
438 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
439 See H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4849. 
See also PEARSON, supra note 81, at 84-85 for a table indicating that routine tanker operations 
account for more than twenty-five percent of all oil pollution in the ocean. 
440 See KINDT, supra note 2, at 5 (citing Falk, Toward a World Order Respectful of the Global 
Ecosystem, 1 ENVTL. AFF. 251, 252 (1971)). 
441 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
442 Dzidzornu & Tsamenyi, supra note 73, and accompanying text. 
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sensitive and probably the most abused component" of the environ-
ment, continued pollution could lead to the collapse of the oceans' 
ecosystem sooner than we imagine.443 
In summary, because of these fundamental changes in the incidents 
of navigation since Grotius wrote his argument in 1613; because of the 
emergence of a new environmental paradigm in our nation to which 
Congress has responded;444 because Congress has expressed its impa-
tience with the pace of developments in the area of international 
environmentallaw;445 and because the law of the sea is one of the most 
dynamic and malleable areas of the law, both domestically and inter-
nationally,446 a U.S. court should give precedence to the Oil Pollution 
Act over the U.N. Convention.447 
D. Failing to Apply the Oil Pollution Act Extraterritorially 
Would Frustrate the Will of Congress 
Failing to apply the Oil Pollution Act extraterritorially would frus-
trate the Act's purpose.448 Congress has chosen to adopt a set of 
stringent criminal penalties that impose varying degrees of punish-
443 See KINDT, supra note 2, at 5. 
444 See Hedman, supra note 241, at 890--91. 
446 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1990) reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 805 (indicating the sense of Congress regarding participation in an interna-
tional regime at least as effective as domestic law). 
446 KINDT, supra note 2, at 3. Indeed, the world is already responding favorably to U.S. 
initiatives to make shipping safer. In March 1992, the International Maritime Organization 
adopted a resolution to amend Regulations 13F and 13G of the MARPOL Protocol requiring 
double hulls on tank vessels. See Resolution ME PC (32), Amendments to the Annex of the 
Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973, Mar. 1992, Annex I. (on file with author). 
447 See 'furley, supra note 90, at 632 n.232 (citing case law in support of the proposition that 
laws passed by Congress have supremacy over international law). 
448 Congress clearly intended to protect U.S. resources by placing severe requirements on 
ships transitting U.S. waters. In the words of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works: 
Spills are still too much of an accepted cost of doing business for the oil shipping 
industry ... [t]he costs of spilling and paying for its cleanup and damage is not high 
enough to encourage greater industry efforts to prevent spills and develop effective 
techniques to contain them. Sound public policy requires reversal of these relative 
costs. The Nation's continued heavy dependence on oil will result in increasing trans-
port of oil in tankers through U.S. waters and greater offshore exploration and pro-
duction in deeper waters and harsher environments. These conditions can only increase 
the potential for future catastrophic oil spills and the need to prevent such pollution 
and minimize its damage. 
S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 723,724. See also 
Grumbles, supra note 3, at 165 (noting that the bill in support of which this report was written 
was the predecessor of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990); Randle, supra note 168, at 10120. Congress 
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ment based on the geographic location of the vessel spilling oil and 
the mens rea of the accused. Applying these provisions only to Ameri-
can flag vessels, which are subject to the acts of Congress wherever 
they may be, would permit a great percentage of the ships traversing 
United States waters to avoid liability altogether, regardless of their 
culpability. 
Such an application of the law would expose Americans and Ameri-
can flag vessels to an extraordinary panoply of penalties to which no 
one else is exposed. This would, in turn, exacerbate the disparity in 
regulation between U.S. flag vessels and vessels registered in flag-of-
convenience states.449 The disincentives to register a vessel in the 
United States or even for a U.S. company to own a vessel and register 
it under a flag of convenience, would be enormous. Many might be forced 
to sell their vessels and rely solely on the vessels of other nations. 
Aside from the adverse effect this would have on the maritime 
industry in the United States, it would exacerbate the prisoner's 
dilemma problem450 in which underdeveloped flag-of-convenience na-
tions are able to take advantage of the benefits that flow from U.S. 
environmental regulation by loosening their own. This, combined with 
the disincentive to register vessels in the United States, could have 
the net effect of exposing the coastal waters of the United States to 
potentially greater risk than they now bear. This is clearly not the 
result Congress intended in passing the Oil Pollution Act. 
The Oil Pollution Act should instead be viewed as Congress' latest 
word in responding to the emerging environmental paradigm. Con-
gress recognized the costs of oil spills and expressed its desire to 
minimize the damage society suffers from those spills.451 In formulat-
ing its new policies, Congress observed that the shipping industry too 
readily accepts oil spills as a cost of doing business and expressed its 
intent to raise industry's costs to encourage it to prevent SpillS.452 To 
chose to protect those resources with sweeping new language, an extensive scheme for imposing 
monetary liability, and criminal penalties. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text. 
Unfortunately, the legislative history on the criminal provisions is too sketchy to be useful in 
interpreting the statutory language. See supra note 220. Thus, as Justice Cardozo explained, 
"when [judges] are called upon to say how far existing rules are to be extended or restricted, 
they must let the welfare of society fix the path, its direction and its distance." CARDOZO, supra 
note 10, at 67. 
449 See supra notes 373-75 and accompanying text. 
450 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
451 See supra note 448 and accompanying text. 
452 See supra note 448 and accompanying text. See also Mitchell, supra note 413 (expressing 
one senator's vehemence on this point); Boos, supra note 112 (analyzing the effect of the Act's 
substantive requirements on vessels registered in nations other than the United States). 
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do so, Congress imposed criminal penalties that provide for lengthy 
prison terms.453 
By including lengthy prison terms, Congress apparently rejected 
the older view that criminal penalties involving incarceration are 
merely substitutes for monetary penalties.454 It appears, instead, to 
have adopted Professor Dau-Schmidt's view that imposing incarcera-
tion is a more effective way to shape preferences than imposing 
financial penalties.455 
The Act should be interpreted in a manner that recognizes the 
increasing attention Congress is paying to the environment456 and the 
pervasive growth in the use of congressionally mandated criminal 
penalties457 to shape the preferences of those who might choose to 
pollute despite the monetary penalties associated with doing SO.458 
Indeed, such a broad interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act offers the 
only potential solution to the "tragedy of the commons" problem.459 
In order to implement this broad interpretation of the Oil Pollution 
Act, the United States must be willing to assume a position of lead-
ership in a new international regime. That regime would use tools 
such as the Oil Pollution Act's criminal penalties to reach a new 
balance between environmental concerns and the freedom of naviga-
tion. Achieving this new balance would require regime members to 
reject the prevailing view of the law of the sea, refusing to continue. 
destroying the world's oceans while paying fealty to the words of a 
Convention that reflects neither the needs of today's world, nor the 
principles that were meant to shape it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has given the President power to 
express the country's moral outrage at those who carelessly pollute 
the marine environment. He may now choose to criminally prosecute 
those responsible for marine disasters. Doing so, however, would 
require him to adopt a new interpretation of the law of the sea. By 
453 See supra notes 222--26 and accompanying text. 
454 See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text. 
455 See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
456 See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. 
457 See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text. 
458 See supra notes 267~8 and accompanying text. Congress clearly intended to raise the cost 
of spilling oil to a level high enough to change behavior in the shipping industry. See also supra 
note 448 and accompanying text. 
469 Stringent enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act and similar laws in other nations could serve 
as the mandate and sanctions needed to solve tragedy of the commons problems. See supra 
notes 76-86 and accompanying text. 
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enforcing the Oil Pollution Act's criminal provisions beyond its terri-
torial sea or within the territorial sea for spills that do not rise to the 
level of willful and serious, the United States would be exercising 
greater power than that allotted to coastal states under the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.460 
The exercise of this jurisdiction is authorized by a strict interpre-
tation of the Oil Pollution Act461 and would carry out the intent of 
Congress.462 No U.S. court should dismiss such a case because it sees 
a violation ofinternationallaw.463 Instead, a court should recognize the 
decision to prosecute as a political question and defer to the Presi-
dent's judgment.464 The use of criminal sanctions to protect the marine 
environment recognizes the environmental paradigm that has 
emerged to govern our society since the 1982 U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea was negotiated.465 The use of these sanctions also 
recognizes that pollution of the oceans is an economic externality 
imposed on society by a relatively few actors.466 The threat of criminal 
sanctions should help shape the preferences of those who would 
choose to cause such an externality,467 and the application of those 
sanctions in a few highly visible cases should serve the Justice De-
partment's goals of deterrence.468 
Some may argue that exercising this power would show a lack of 
respect for international standards that amounts to lawlessness469 or 
could lead to retaliation by other states.470 Customary international 
law, however, is a malleable concept.471 Its malleability has led the 
world to adopt an all powerful concept of freedom of navigation. 
Today's version of that concept has grown beyond that conceived by 
Hugo Grotius and is out ofline with the needs of the modern world.472 
460 See supra note 398 and accompanying text. 
461 See supra notes 411-12 and accompanying text. 
462 See supra notes 451-59 and accompanying text. 
463 See supra notes 444-47 and accompanying text. 
464 See supra note 357 and accompanying text. 
465 See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. 
466 See supra notes 78--82 and accompanying text. 
467 See supra notes 267-79, 448, 458 and accompanying text. 
468 See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
469 See Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1537 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 
(1978) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("If the government becomes a law breaker it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy ... [and] would 
bring terrible retribution."). 
470 [d. 
471 See supra notes 68-69, 71-72 and accompanying text. But see Sohn, supra note 70, at 271 
(giving the concept a greater degree of structure). 
472 See supra notes 428-37 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, enforcing the Oil Pollution Act against American 
vessels and not against others could lead American flag ships to seek 
flags of convenience in other nations.473 If this happens, aggressive 
enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act would, ironically, expose U.S. 
waters to an even greater risk of pollution.474 
To avoid this result, some will no doubt argue that the best solution 
is to amend the Oil Pollution Act to comport with a particular view of 
international law or to not enforce it at all.475 These solutions are, of 
course, no answer. They are retrenchments. They would calIon Con-
gress to admit that it did not mean what it said. This argument would 
only be made by those with vested interests in polluting the environ-
ment, who are resisting the push to internalize the costs they impose 
on society, but whose attention has nonetheless been keenly focused 
by the risk of criminal penalties.476 
With the emergence of the new environmental paradigm in the 
United States and with concern for the environment growing around 
the world,477 perhaps the time has come to challenge the status quo. 
Perhaps the nations of the world should reread the words of Hugo 
Grotius to see just how badly the current law distorts his initial 
reasoning. Perhaps in doing so, the world will realize that the old 
UNCLOS rule is missing its aim and can no longer justify its exist-
ence.478 
Grotius' ideas were indeed prescient in their day. His words better 
accommodate the exigencies of modern shipping than the rules devel-
oped just ten years ago, presumably following his lead. Perhaps the 
time has come for the United States to lead the way to a new under-
standing of Grotius' freedom of the seas. Perhaps the new rule will 
"let the welfare of society fix [its] path .... "479 Perhaps the day is 
closer than we realize when we will no longer hear of oil tanker 
captains running twenty-five million gallons of oil onto the rocks, 
exposing us all to another marine disaster, only to hear, "Under inter-
national law, I don't think the Captain can be charged, but one must 
question the prudence of his seamanship."480 
473 See supra notes 373-75, 449--fi0 and accompanying text. 
474 See supra notes 449-50 and accompanying text. 
476 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 26, and accompanying text. 
476 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
477 See Richard J. Williamson, Jr., Building the International Environmental Regime: A 
Status Report, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 679 (1990); See also HAFKAMP, supra note 83, 
at 17. 
478 CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 66. 
479 Id. at 67. 
480 See Wills, supra note 1, and accompanying text. 
